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East Asia has become a major hub for global trade. At the center of this East 
Asian factory are three nations–China, Japan, and South Korea–which have benefited the 
most economically. Yet, despite transnational value chains and the trilateral political 
cooperation that binds these nations, they have yet to conclude a trilateral free trade 
agreement (FTA).  
Since 1999, the China-Japan-South Korea FTA has proved to be an elusive feat 
for these Northeast Asian neighbors. Historical and political animosities and popular 
mistrust seem to have a corrosive effect upon the trilateral relationship despite decades of 
political cooperation and economic interdependence. What explains the limited progress 
toward a China-Japan-South Korea FTA? This thesis tests four potential explanations for 
the trilateral FTA’s current lack of progress: perceptions of the deal not being an 
economic priority, the power of influential domestic business interests negatively 
affected by the FTA, regional competition over China’s growing domestic market, and 
regional political-historical animosities. Overall, this research concludes that Japan is the 
least willing participant to push for progress toward a trilateral FTA, and a lack of 
perception of the deal not being an economic priority is the strongest explanation. 
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A. WHAT EXPLAINS THE LIMITED PROGRESS TOWARD A CHINA-
JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT? 
East Asia has become a major hub for global trade. The region leads the global 
trend of free trade agreement (FTA)1 formation with 71 FTAs—40% of the world’s 
FTAs—currently signed into law since the creation of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 1995.2 In East Asia, no one FTA is the same. Every FTA can be placed along 
two spectrums concerning standards and participants. Low-standard FTAs merely reduce 
trade barriers for certain goods, whereas high-standard FTAs include both goods and 
services and are deeply integrative. In regard to participants involved, FTAs can be 
reciprocal agreements between just two states or may include entire regions. 
Despite being major hubs for world trade, the three major economic powers of 
East Asia, China-Japan-South Korea, have yet to sign their own regional, multilateral 
FTA. Trilateral track-one executive and foreign ministry summits since 2008 have yet to 
produce a trilateral FTA. The research question underpinning this thesis is: what explains 
the limited progress toward a China-Japan-South Korea FTA?   
This thesis tests four potential explanations for the trilateral FTA’s current lack of 
progress: perceptions of the deal not being an economic priority, the power of influential 
domestic business interests negatively affected by the FTA, regional competition over 
China’s growing domestic market, and regional political-historical animosities. Evidence 
for the trilateral FTA not being an economic priority is the strongest for China and Japan, 
while evidence for South Korea is inclusive. In regard to the explanation of domestic 
business interests, there is weak supporting evidence among all three countries. The third 
explanation of competition over the Chinese domestic market has weak evidence from 
Japan and South Korea, while evidence from China is inconclusive. The final explanation 
of regional political-historical animosities causing a lack of progress toward the trilateral 
                                                 
1 There are multiple terms for a FTA, such as preferential trade agreement (PTA) or a regional trade 
agreement (RTA). This proposal will use the term free trade agreement (FTA). 
2 World Trade Organization, “Regional Trade Agreements,” Regional Trade Agreements Information 
System (RTA-IS), accessed November 21, 2014, http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx. 
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FTA is not supported by the Chinese and Japanese evidence, but there is strong South 
Korean evidence. Overall, Japan is the least willing participant to push for progress 
toward a trilateral FTA, and a lack of perception of the deal not being an economic 
priority has the strongest evidence to support that explanation. 
B. HOW IMPORTANT IS A TRILATERAL FTA IN NORTHEAST ASIA? 
The creation of a China-Japan-South Korea FTA would be a significant 
development not only among the Northeast Asian (NEA) states but also for the larger 
East Asia region and for the United States. This section will list some of the potential 
promises of a trilateral FTA as well as some significant implications of the failure to 
create a trilateral FTA. 
A China-Japan-South Korea FTA would enable these three NEA countries to 
leverage their comparative advantages in production so as to benefit from an increase in 
their overall productivity and welfare. The combination of China’s advantages in low-
wage labor with Japanese and South Korean technology and higher value-added 
manufacturing would create a production juggernaut. The FTA would connect an 
estimated $24.6 trillion of gross domestic product based on purchasing power parity 
(GDP-PPP) as compared to the E.U. with $18.1 trillion and NAFTA with $21.1 trillion.3 
A trilateral FTA would allow the Japanese economy ($4.8 trillion GDP-PPP) and the 
South Korean economy ($1.8 trillion GDP-PPP) to be plugged into the larger Chinese 
economy ($18 trillion), which has overtaken the size of the United States economy 
($17.4 trillion) in terms of GDP-PPP.4 The effect of a trilateral FTA would create a one-
time increase of GDP by an estimated .3% for China, .37% for Japan, and 3.55% for 
South Korea.5 
In regard to the East Asia region, a China-Japan-South Korea FTA would 
                                                 
3 $24.6 trillion of GDP-PPP was determined as aggregate sum of GDP-PPP for China, Japan, and 
South Korea GDP-PPP for October 2014. International Monetary Fund, “IMF DataMapper,” accessed 
October 28, 2014, http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php.  
4 GDP-PPP values as of October 2014. Ibid.  
5 A 2005 analysis by the Trilateral Research Project provides a joint estimation. Trilateral Cooperation 
Secretariat, “Free Trade Agreement,” 2013 Trilateral Statistics, accessed December 8, 2014, 
http://www.tcs-asia.org/dnb/user/userpage.php?lpage=3_6_2_contents. 
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formally cement and deepen the economic interdependencies that have informally tied 
China-Japan-South Korea—hot economics despite cold politics. Creating deeper 
economic interdependence between China-Japan-South Korea is advantageous for  
the region because such ties promote peaceful interactions by making war more costly, 
which in turn increases regional stability.6  War is made mutually more costly by the 
investments between countries. Japanese and South Korean foreign direct investment 
(FDI) creates factories and jobs in China, while China uses such investment to acquire 
new technology and relies on the other two countries as markets for its products. Through 
the WTO, multilateral investment agreements, and an eventual FTA, China-Japan-South 
Korea can create a relationship of complex interdependence in which multiple contacts 
between state and non-state actors coupled with no one issue dominating any state’s 
agenda can drastically reduce the probability of military conflict.7  
Yet, if China-Japan-South Korea fail to lock themselves into a trilateral FTA, then 
the three states risk the potential breakdown of the current status quo of hot economics 
and cold politics (zhengleng jingre or seirei keinetsu), which has so far mediated 
relations. 8 Business commentators have recently opined on this risk as levels of FDI and 
trade has dropped off between China-Japan-South Korea.9 In regard to Sino-Japanese 
relations, the recent weakening of Sino-Japanese economic interdependence is a 
potentially dangerous situation in that economic interdependence “can be ‘war-inducing’ 
instead of ‘peace-inducing’ if ‘states do not expect high levels of interdependence to 
continue.’”10 
In the scenario of no trilateral FTA and cooling economics, the implications for 
the U.S. are serious. In light of security dilemmas and historical animosities, economic 
                                                 
6 John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000), 155. 
7 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power & Interdependence, 4th edition (Boston: Pearson, 
2011), 232–3. 
8 Dong Wang, “China-Japan Relations - Now What?,” PacNet (Honolulu, Hawaii: Pacific Forum 
CSIS, January 17, 2013), http://csis.org/files/publication/Pac136.pdf. 
9 Gordon G. Chang, “The Chinese And Japanese Economies Are Delinking: Prelude To Conflict?,” 
Forbes, February 16, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2014/02/16/the-chinese-and-
japanese-economies-are-delinking-prelude-to-conflict/. 
10 Samuel Huntington quoted in Ibid. 
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interdependence would no longer serve as a mitigating variable among China-Japan-
South Korea. American interests of preserving peace and stability in the Asia–Pacific 
region would become increasingly challenged by the ability of regionally divisive issues, 
such as the Senkaku Islands, East China Sea boundaries, and World War II grievances, to 
ratchet up Sino-Japanese tensions.11  
Not concluding a trilateral FTA would also have the effect of adding more 
bilateral FTAs to the East Asian noodle bowl of trade agreements. Separate trade 
agreements among China-Japan-South Korea would not only complicate conducting 
business among the three, but also add to the cost of doing business. Foreign firms would 
have to untangle multiple rules that would add to the overhead cost of conducting 
business in China-Japan-South Korea. The risk for these states is that Western firms 
could become averse to doing business in Northeast Asia. American and European firms 
could end up directing their investment and technology to states that already have 
regional FTAs and are more conducive for globalized trade. 
In regard to the American role in the region, not concluding a trilateral FTA can 
potentially serve U.S. interests by maintaining American influence and power in the 
region. A stalemate in NEA regional economic cooperation maintains the status-quo in 
East Asia in which the U.S. plays a pivotal role as both an economic and security 
provider. This status-quo is a form of hedging and balancing by Japan and South Korea in 
regard to Chinese power due to a perception of mistrust.12 For the Japanese, China is to 
be balanced against by a policy combination of “dynamic defense” and “dynamic 
deterrence.”13 For the South Koreans, the influence and power of China is hedged by 
“Seoul’s calculated strategic ambiguity.”14 These policies are backstopped by the hub-
and-spoke alliance system that binds Japan and South Korea to America. Any reduction 
                                                 
11 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review 2014,” QDR (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Defense, 2014), chap. 1. 
12 Jae Ho Chung, “East Asia Responds to the Rise of China: Patterns and Variations,” Pacific Affairs 
82, no. 4 (2009): 657–75. 
13 Ken Jimbo, “The Rise of China and Japan’s Foreign Policy Reorientation,” in China’s Power and 
Asian Security, ed. Mingjiang Li and Kalyan M. Kemburi, 1st edition (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2014), 259. 
14 Jae Ho Chung, “Korean Views of Korea-China Relations: Evolving Perceptions and Upcoming 
Challenges,” Asian Perspective 36 (2012): 221. 
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of a perception of mistrust, such as binding trilateral FTA, reduces the utility of American 
regional involvement. The status-quo also compels China to accept American 
involvement in the region as a mediating force between itself and its NEA neighbors. 
While the Chinese may decry American influence in the region as a holdover from the 
Cold War, they do not deny that the American presence has utility in ensuring a peaceful 
environment for China.15 
Conversely, a successful trilateral FTA could not necessarily be in the U.S. best 
interest in East Asia. Such an exclusive agreement among these NEA actors could 
possibly diminish the role and influence of American power in the region. For Japan and 
South Korea, enhanced cooperation and stability could reduce the utility of the U.S. hub-
and-spoke alliance system in East Asia. A successful trilateral FTA could provide Japan 
and South Korea with a sense of assurance regarding Chinese foreign policy, which is 
often seen as aggressive. Essentially, a trilateral FTA could help change the regional 
environment so as to allow China, Japan, and South Korea to reassess their interests vis-
à-vis the role of the U.S. in East Asia. In Robert Keohane’s critique of balance of power, 
he asserts that “under different systemic conditions states will define their self-interests,” 
and such conditions depend on whether or not the “environment is malign or benign.”16 
The nature of the environment “can alter the standard operating procedures and sense of 
identity of the actors [states] themselves.”17 The cold politics in the region in which the 
U.S. has played a mediating role could change into a more benign environment that could 
lead China, Japan, and South Korea to identify their self-interests as not requiring the 
current level of American involvement in the region. 
Overall, a trilateral FTA would have immense repercussions for China-Japan-
South Korea, East Asia, and the United States. This chapter will outline the factors and 
causal mechanisms at play in regard to a trilateral FTA. 
                                                 
15 Peng Yuan, “Awaiting the Handshake: China-U.S. Relations Are the Key to Stability in Northeast 
Asia,” Global Asia 6, no. 2 (2011): 34–37. 
16 Robert O. Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 194. 
17 Ibid. 
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C. CONTEXTUALIZING A CHINA-JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA FTA 
The literature review focuses on two particular literatures concerning China-
Japan-South Korea economic cooperation toward a FTA: FTA formation and Northeast 
Asia (NEA) economic regionalism. This review will examine both literatures so as to 
draw out causal factors at various levels of analysis that shape China-Japan-South Korea 
economic cooperation. First, the review will divide FTA formation factors along the 
levels of analysis, and then put them into context of what types of FTAs have been 
created in the region as compared to elsewhere. Second, the literature on NEA economic 
regionalism will assess theoretical factors that encompass both state and non-state 
motivations as either forces that bind or separate NEA economic regionalism. Third, 
overarching factors that link both literatures will be identified in order to pose potential 
explanations in regard to the lack of progress toward a trilateral FTA, which will be 
drawn on for the rest of the thesis. 
1. Factors for FTA Formation 
The FTA formation factors provide a range of reasons for why China-Japan-South 
Korea would seek a trilateral FTA. These reasons include fostering state-led regionalism, 
expanding trade flows and efficiencies, competition over regional market-share and 
influence, and concerns over domestic politics. Each of these reasons affect the type and 
quality of FTA formed.  
a. FTAs Used for State-Led Regionalism 
The formation of the European Union (E.U.) provides an example of previously 
antagonistic states that used high-quality FTAs to promote economic and political 
regionalism. In the European context, economic regionalism was and still remains a 
highly formalized state-led project. The roots of the E.U. were planted with the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty of 1951 that bound Western European 
countries together into an economic customs union. Despite being limited to certain 
economic sectors, ECSC created a multilateral, de jure, and independent supra-national 
bureaucracy that would evolve into a common market, the European Economic 
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Community (EEC), and then into its final form as an all-encompassing economic union.18 
The motivation for creating the ECSC was born from the trauma of two world wars that 
engulfed the European Continent. Leaders from France, Germany, and Britain 
internalized the importance of creating a binding regional institution that could mediate 
both economic and political regional factors.19  
Yet, in the comparative literature of regionalism, there is disagreement as to 
whether a comparison to East Asia is possible.20 The disagreement stems from the use of 
the E.U. as the definitive example of regionalism, which is related to the general criticism 
of applying European derived nation-state interaction patterns to East Asian states.21 
Criticism of applying the E.U. model to East Asia is that the E.U. is a sui generis case 
that cannot be applied outside of its context.22 According to the criticism, the pattern of 
regionalization in Europe is specific to the continent-based interactions of Europe as 
opposed to the maritime interactions of East Asia.23 Also, regionalism in NEA has been 
attributed to non-state forces that will be described in the regional factors section of this 
review. Despite such criticism, the example of the ECSC and the E.U. still remain 
relevant for examining the potential political-economic trajectory of China-Japan-South 
Korea.   
b. Trade Flows and Efficiencies 
A macroeconomic reason why nations form FTAs is because they are following 
prevailing trade flows and wish to increase both volume and efficiency of trade. This  
 
                                                 
18 Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of 
International Trade Agreements, Kindle edition (Princeton University Press, 2012), Location 278. 
19 Mark Beeson, “Rethinking Regionalism: Europe and East Asia in Comparative Historical 
Perspective,” Journal of European Public Policy 12, no. 6 (2005): 969–85, 
http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1080/13501760500270620. 
20 Fredrik Soderbaum, “Theories of Regionalism,” in Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism, ed. 
Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs, 1st edition (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 
2011), 11–21. 
21 Ibid., 15. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ellen L. Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub, 2008), 13. 
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follows from the idea that nations close in proximity will naturally come to conclude a 
trade deal.24  
An efficiency explanation highlights how an FTA partner country can become 
more efficient in producing a certain product and entice others to enter into FTA 
negotiations. Initially, efficiency is achieved by an FTA partner state by the FTA’s ability 
to harmonize and lower tariff rules as well opening economic sectors to competition 
through trade-liberalizing rules. As previously protected sectors are forced to compete, 
they must become efficient or collapse. The partner state’s production efficiency has the 
follow-on effect of attracting other countries to negotiate separate FTAs with the efficient 
producer as well as direct FDI in order to utilize the comparative advantage of the 
efficient producer for the benefit of the investing state’s transnational corporations 
(TNCs). The efficient producer state will agree to such FTAs because such agreements 
can maximize the amount of capital and foreign technology that can be received as well 
as increase levels of a state’s welfare.25  
c. International Factors 
FTAs can form as a means of projecting a nation’s economic market-share in a 
desired region. This push factor is ascribed to the explosion of FTAs in East Asia.26 
Similar to states being driven by relative gains, states sign FTAs to lock in preferential 
trade patterns and influences that are in their favor. As one state seeks out FTAs, other 
states seek to establish similar guarantees in what Richard Baldwin calls the “domino 
effect.”27 In the domino scenario, states not involved in a regional bilateral FTA will seek 
to be included by proposing a regional trilateral FTA. This effect has been attributed to 
South Korean bilateral FTAs with the U.S. and E.U. that serve as an impetus for 
                                                 
24 Mireya Solís and Saori N. Katada, “Understanding East Asian Cross-Regionalism: An Analytical 
Framework,” Pacific Affairs 80, no. 2 (July 1, 2007): 238. 
25 Ronald J. Wonnacott, “Free-Trade Agreements: For Better or Worse?,” The American Economic 
Review 86, no. 2 (May 1, 1996): 62–64. 
26 Solís and Katada, “Understanding East Asian Cross-Regionalism,” 232. 
27 Richard E. Baldwin, “The Causes of Regionalism,” World Economy 20, no. 7 (November 1, 1997): 
865–88, doi:10.1111/1467-9701.00107. 
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economic cooperation between China-Japan-South Korea.28 Similarly, the formation of 
regional trade-blocs such as NAFTA and the E.U. can spur other states to sign FTAs with 
those bloc states so as to ensure the non-bloc state’s market share is not diverted.29 
Additionally, FTAs may be entered into as a form of economic diplomacy rather 
than for economic efficiency and utility.30 Mirye Solis and Saori Katada attribute this 
desire as driving China to sign the China-ASEAN FTA (CAFTA) despite the fact that 
Chinese exports were already quickly overtaking those of the ASEAN states.31 In this 
regard, CAFTA was signed in order to garner good-will between China and the ASEAN 
states.32 
d. Domestic Factors 
The impact of trade flows can have immense influence on national politics 
including “individuals’ political beliefs, as well as on the political institutions they 
support.”33 By increasing overall social welfare and collecting electoral windfalls, FTAs 
create political incentives for national leaders and their ruling parties to ratify FTAs.34 
FTAs allows leaders and their political parties to “reassure the public and domestic 
groups about their decision making.”35  
Beside incumbent leaders and their political parties, there are other domestic 
factors that affect FTA formation. Government institutional players, business interest 
groups, non-governmental organizations, and civil-society groups can incur political 
                                                 
28 Gregory P. Corning, “Trade Regionalism in a Realist East Asia: Rival Visions and Competitive 
Bilateralism,” Asian Perspective 35, no. 2 (2011): 259–86. 
29 Stephen Hoadley, “Southeast Asian Cross-Regional FTAs: Origins, Motives and Aims,” Pacific 
Affairs 80, no. 2 (July 1, 2007): 303–25. 
30 Solís and Katada, “Understanding East Asian Cross-Regionalism,” 248. 
31 Ibid., 249. 
32 Guiguo Wang, “China’s FTAs: Legal Characteristics and Implications,” The American Journal of 
International Law 105, no. 3 (July 1, 2011): 495, doi:10.5305/amerjintelaw.105.3.0493. 
33 Mansfield and Milner, Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements, 
Location 210. 
34 Ibid., Location 805. 
35 Ibid., Location 438. 
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costs if they view an FTA as not being in their interest.36 Conversely, such players as the 
Japanese Keidanren (business federation) or the South Korean Chaebol (industrial 
conglomerates) can also promote FTA negotiation.37 If an FTA is to be politically viable, 
the political benefits must outweigh the costs for incumbent leaders. This is not as simple 
as counting winners versus losers. Rather, what matters is which politically influential 
economic sector stands to lose. Domestic political structures that favor one economic 
sector over another can, intentional or unintentionally, act as chokepoints in the domestic 
political negotiations of an FTA. For instance, the Japanese agricultural sector, norin-
zoku, is particularly influential because of its disproportionate electoral influence.38 The 
norin-zoku created a sizable drag effect on former PM Junichiro Koizumi’s ability to 
ratify many of Japan’s FTAs.39 
e. Types and Patterns of NEA FTAs 
FTAs are not uniform as they can possess differing trade-liberalizing qualities. 
High quality FTAs produce agreements that liberalize trade beyond the current WTO 
multilateral agreements. Such “WTO-plus” agreements open up sectors to competition 
that have not been affected by the agreements reached during the WTO’s Uruguay 
Round.40 Low-quality FTAs are those agreements that merely lock-in unilateral tariff 
reductions and other previously established agreements.41 
East Asian and developed Western economies have approached FTA formation 
differently. North American FTA (NAFTA), Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic 
                                                 
36 Guoyou Song and Wen Jin Yuan, “China’s Free Trade Agreement Strategies,” The Washington 
Quarterly 35, no. 4 (October 2012): 116, doi:10.1080/0163660X.2012.726425. 
37 Barry Desker, “In Defense of FTAs: From Purity to Pragmatism in East Asia,” The Pacific Review 
17, no. 1 (March 2004): 13, doi:10.1080/0951274042000182393. 
38 In Japan’s electoral system, one rural vote count for five urban votes. See Isabel Reynolds and 
Maiko Takahashi, “Cities Set to Lose in Japan Election as Rural Voters Keep Clout,” Bloomberg, 
November 26, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-11-26/court-rules-japan-2013-election-held-
in-unconstitutional-state-.html. 
39 Mansfield and Milner, Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements, 
Location 1495. 
40 Razeen Sally, “Free Trade Agreements and the Prospects for Regional Integration in East Asia,” 
Asian Economic Policy Review 1, no. 2 (December 2006): 308, doi:10.1111/j.1748-3131.2006.00036.x. 
41 Menon, “Preferential and Non-Preferential Approaches to Trade Liberalization in East Asia,” 4. 
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Agreement (ANZCERTA), and the E.U. are examples of high-quality FTAs, as these 
arrangements include many WTO-plus issues other than tariff lines on traded goods.42 
Other than Singapore and Hong Kong SAR, the ASEAN states have been the leaders of 
producing “FTA-light” arrangements that maintain protectionist provisions rather than 
liberalizing reforms.43 China uses a mix of high- and low-quality FTAs, but other than 
FTAs with Singapore and Hong Kong SAR, most of its FTAs in East Asia (e.g., CAFTA) 
are low quality. Chinese low-quality FTAs abound in East Asia because China is more 
concerned with garnering political credibility with ASEAN and neighboring states by 
deferring WTO-plus provisions on more sensitive sectors and services.44 Japan and South 
Korea tend to produce stronger FTAs in the region as compared to ASEAN states and 
China, but Japanese and Korean FTAs are less liberalizing than U.S. or E.U. FTAs 
because Japan and Korea are generally opposed to opening their agricultural sectors.45 
The most comprehensive WTO-plus agreement currently in East Asia is the Republic of 
Korea–U.S. FTA (KORUSFTA) that went into effect in 2012.46 Yet, even the 
KORUSFTA bent to heavy domestic Korean pressure to exclude their rice market from 
the agreement.47 
2. NEA Economic Regionalism: The Forces that Bind  
There are various regional factors that push and pull on NEA economic 
cooperation. The regional factors provide both the context and theoretical motivation in 
which FTA formational reasons would have to operate. The regional factors are assessed 
                                                 
42 WTO-plus issues other than goods include: services, investment, labor movement, government 
procurement, trade facilitation, competition rules regulatory cooperation, and dispute settlement. See Sally, 
“Free Trade Agreements and the Prospects for Regional Integration in East Asia,” 308. 
43 Singapore and Hong Kong SAR are free-port economies and have a vested interested in creating 
high-quality FTAs that open other markets to their products and services. Also, these city-states do not 
have agricultural sectors, which are normally averse to liberalized trade deals. See Sally, “Free Trade 
Agreements and the Prospects for Regional Integration in East Asia,” 313. 
44 Ibid., 309–312. 
45 Masahiro Kawai and Ganeshan Wignaraja, “Asian FTAs: Trends, Prospects, and Challenges,” Asian 
Development Bank, no. 226 (October 2010): 17–19. 
46 Jeffrey J. Schott, “Why the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement Is a Big Deal,” SERI 
Quarterly, 2011, 23–29. 
47 Ibid., 24. 
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are those that have acted equally upon China-Japan-South Korea, and include factors that 
both facilitate and prevent NEA economic cooperation. Factors that push cooperation 
include the GATT/WTO liberal trade architecture, ASEAN-driven regionalism, regional 
production ties, and state-led trilateral cooperation. Factors that pull at cooperation 
include conflicting identities, concerns over relative gains, and concerns over state 
sovereignty. 
a. GATT/WTO Architecture 
The post-World War II GATT/WTO multilateral trade architecture has provided 
influential institutional and economic norms that pervade through NEA regionalism.48 
This architecture provides mutually binding reduction of trade barriers and increased 
overall levels of trade by creating a standard set of rules, intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs) that provide transparency, and dispute settlement mechanisms (DSMs) that treat 
all states equally.49 This architecture provides a liberal institutional underpinning to NEA 
regionalism.50 Specifically, the GATT/WTO architecture provides China-Japan-South 
Korea with self-satisfying interdependencies based on the current liberal trade system. 
While the current global liberal trade regime has provided the common 
groundwork for interaction between China-Japan-South Korea, the WTO has been 
stymied in its efforts to advance a more liberalized multilateral trade standard since the 
initiation of the Doha Round in 2001. Unable to pursue global multilateral trade reform, 
East Asian states have continued with creating bilateral and multilateral regional FTAs, 
including initiatives such as the trilateral FTA, the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Free Trade Area of the 
Asia-Pacific (FTAAP).51  
                                                 
48 Desker, “In Defence of FTAs,” 4. 
49 Heribert Dieter, “Trade Integration in Asia,” in Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism, ed. 
Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs, 1st edition (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 
2011), 120. 
50 G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China, the United States, and the Future of the Liberal International 
Order,” in Tangled Titans: The United States and China, ed. David Shambaugh, 1st edition (Lanham, Md: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 54. 
51 See Christopher M. Dent, “Paths Ahead for East Asia and Asia–Pacific Regionalism,” International 
Affairs 89, no. 4 (July 1, 2013): 963–85, doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12054; Desker, “In Defence of FTAs.” 
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b. ASEAN Driven Regionalism 
Although located outside the NEA region, ASEAN has become the center of 
regional economic cooperation in East Asia.52 In regard to China-Japan-South Korea, 
ASEAN Plus Three (APT), an expansion of ASEAN that includes China-Japan-South 
Korea, has become an important institution that facilitates China-Japan-South Korea 
interaction across multiple governmental levels.53 Yet agreements and instruments 
created by ASEAN and APT have proven limited in their utility.54 ASEAN is also framed 
as being institutionally weak, and as being undercut by the competition between China 
and Japan for regional leadership.55 While this competition has resulted in ASEAN 
becoming a hub for FTAs in the region, it is not seen as having sufficient power to serve 
as a regional leader for further East Asian cooperation.56 
c. Foreign Direct Investment, Transnational Corporations, and Global 
Value Chains 
Unlike the European experience of state-led regionalism, NEA economic 
regionalism has been guided by private business concerns that have tied the region 
together through links of investment and production. Specifically, Japanese FDI through 
transnational corporations (TNCs) has played a vital role in building industrial capacity in 
China.57 The prominence of China in hosting Japanese FDI has steadily increased since 
the 1980s, and as of 2012, China overtook ASEAN as being the main recipient of 
                                                 
52 Jennifer Amyx, “Regional Financial Cooperation in East Asia since the Asian Financial Crisis,” in 
Crisis as Catalyst: Asia’s Dynamic Political Economy, ed. Andrew MacIntyre, T. J. Pempel, and John 
Ravenhill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 118. 
53 Ibid., 120. 
54 Saori N. Katada, “Regional Financial Cooperation,” in Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism, 
ed. Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs, 1st edition (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2011), 131–2. 
55 Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism, 226–7. 
56 William T. Tow, ed., Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional-Global Nexus?, 1st edition 
(Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1–2. 
57 Min Ye, “The Rise of China and East Asian Regionalism,” in Routledge Handbook of Asian 
Regionalism, ed. Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs, 1st edition (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, 
NY: Routledge, 2011), 253. 
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Japanese FDI in East Asia.58 These FDI flows are immune to the oscillating levels of 
political hostility between China and Japan.59 This immunity can be attributed to the 
desire of Japanese TNCs to leverage China’s comparative advantage in low-wage 
production as well as to maintain and expand Japanese market share in a Chinese 
domestic economy of 1.3 billion people.60  
Beyond maximizing efficiency and profit, consistent Japanese FDI into China can 
be attributed to complex interdependence that has developed between these two states.61 
Complex interdependence enmeshes states in a series of sensitivity and vulnerability 
interdependencies that constrain aggressive behavior.62 Within in the context of complex 
interdependency, no one issue can stop economic interactions such as trade and 
investment.63 Thus, FDI is an important signal of economic cooperation. FDI indicates 
economic cooperation because it shows the willingness of foreign investors to transfer 
capital and technology to boost economic production. In return, the host nation agrees to 
not expropriate foreign-affiliated firms and provide mechanisms for recourse in case of 
disputes.64 Firms will then locate production points where products can be produced and 
transported efficiently along a global value chain (GVC).65 As of 2013, GVCs accounted 
for 60% of gross world trade and 80% of gross world trade could be linked to GVC 
production networks.66 Acting as the nexus between investment and trade, GVCs in East 
                                                 
58 Based on Japanese FDI data from UNTACD Bilateral FDI Statistics. 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx. 
59 Corning, “Trade Regionalism in a Realist East Asia,” 269. 
60 Research Division, Policy, and Strategy, “Survey Report on Overseas Business Operations by 
Japanese Manufacturing Companies.,” Outlook for Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation, November 2014), 23, http://www.jbic.go.jp/en/information/press/press-
2014/1128-32994. 
61 Oneal and Russett, Triangulating Peace, 155. 
62 Keohane and Nye, Power & Interdependence, 232–3. 
63 Ibid., 20–1. 
64 Gregory P. Corning, “CJK Investment Agreements in East Asia: Building a Bifurcated Investment 
Regime,” Asian Politics & Policy 6, no. 2 (2014): 286–8. 
65 OECD, “Global Value Chains,” Industry and Globalization, accessed November 19, 2014, 
http://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/global-value-chains.htm. 
66 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for 
Development (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations, 2013), 135, 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=664382. 
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Asia have enmeshed states in production links in what is commonly called Factory 
Asia.67 The implications of Factory Asia is that China-Japan-South Korea have 
developed linkages that requires each other to maintain complementary levels of 
economic well-being. 
d. Trilateral Summits and China-Japan-South Korea FTA Negotiations 
China-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Summits have been the most recent 
manifestation of NEA regional cooperation. These meetings involve the participation of 
national chief executives and various ministers with the goal of increasing investment and 
trade as formalized under a China-Japan-South Korea FTA.68 These summits created the 
Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS), which continues the dialogue beyond the track-
one level of the Trilateral Summits and Trilateral Ministerial Meetings.  
These trilateral forums, independent of ASEAN mediation, can be attributed to 
another facet of complex interdependence, multiple channels of contact.69 Like the lack 
of hierarchy of issues, multiple channels of contact ensure that economic cooperation can 
continue.70 Thus, even when track-one trilateral summitry comes to a dead-stop, as 
happened in 2013 due to political tensions over the East China Sea and Yasukuni Shrine, 
other venues such as the TCS and Trilateral Ministerial Meetings can continue the 
dialogue.71 
                                                 
67 Dieter, “Trade Integration in Asia,” 117. 
68 See Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Joint Press Conference by Prime Minister Taro Aso 
of Japan, Premier Wen Jiabao of the People’s Republic of China, and President Lee Myung-Bak of the 
Republic of Korea Following the Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit Meeting,” December 13, 2008, 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/asospeech/2008/12/13kaiken_e.html. 
69 Keohane and Nye, Power & Interdependence, 20–1. 
70 Ibid. 
71 The next round of FTA negotiations are scheduled for 23-29 Nov 2014. See “S. Korea to Hold Fresh 
Round of Talks for 3-Way FTA with Japan, China,” The Korea Times, accessed November 25, 2014, 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2014/11/116_168602.html. 
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3. NEA Economic Regionalism: The Forces that Separate 
While there are many factors that increase NEA economic regionalism, there are 
nearly as many factors that pull the region apart. These forces that separate are: 
conflicting identities, concerns over relative gains, and concerns over state sovereignty. 
a. China-Japan-South Korea Identities 
Security concerns, territorial disputes, nationalism, and war history inform how 
these NEA states identify with each other as either partners or adversaries. For instance, 
South Korea let its FTA negotiations with Japan die on the vine in 2008 due to political 
and historical animosities and has yet to signal any interest in resuscitating that bilateral 
FTA.72 How China-Japan-South Korea identify with each other are products of past 
interactions, and these socially constructed identities will drive future interactions so as to 
maintain those identities.73 Constructivist thought suggests that identities drive 
interactions, so that “people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the 
meanings that the objects [or actors] have for them.”74 Memories of Japan during World 
War II inform regional perspectives of identity.75 The acrimony that these identities 
produce create political impediments on issues such as trade and investment.76 
b. Concerns over Relative Gains 
Realist concerns over relative economic gains is another force that pulls apart 
NEA regional economic cooperation. Relative gains drive states to “ask not ‘Will both of 
                                                 
72Kevin J. Cooney and Alex Scarbrough, “Japan and South Korea: Can These Two Nations Work 
Together?” Asian Affairs, an American Review 35, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 177. 
73 Ted Hopf, “Identity Relations and the Sino-Soviet Split,” in Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social 
Scientists, ed. Yoshiko M. Herrera et al., 1st edition (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 281. 
74 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 
International Organization 46, no. 2 (April 1, 1992): 396–7. 
75 Thomas U. Berger, “The Politics of Memory in Japanese Foreign Relations,” in Japan in 
International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State, ed. Thomas U. Berger, Mike M. 
Mochizuki, and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub, 2007), 179–211; Daniel Sneider, 
“Textbooks and Patriotic Education: Wartime Memory Formation in China and Japan,” Asia-Pacific 
Review 20, no. 1 (May 2013): 35–54, doi:10.1080/13439006.2013.793065. 
76 Ye, “The Rise of China and East Asian Regionalism,” 260–1. 
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us gain?’ but ‘who will gain more?’”77 Within this framework, domestic differences that 
abound in the region matter little as states are primarily concerned with survival in 
regional hierarchical power relationships with an emphasis on relative power.78 Since 
states are more inclined to balance rather than bandwagon,79 strong states will seek to 
dominate other competitors for regional leadership by having a preponderance of power 
relative to others.80 The implication of these concerns is that states will not enter into 
FTAs that disproportionately favors others. If one state receives more market share of a 
desired economy as a product of an FTA, then the other state will not agree unless it too 
receives a similar cut. Thus, the estimated spread of GDP gains of the proposed trilateral 
FTA—.3%, .37%, and 3.55% for China-Japan-South Korea, respectively—could serve as 
a point of contention between the three states. 
c. Concerns over State Sovereignty 
Another limiting factor toward greater NEA economic regionalism is that China-
Japan-South Korea are state-centered and jealously guard all facets of state sovereignty.81 
The intense focus by East Asian states on sovereignty issues is due to both the unsettled 
nature of territorial dispute and post-colonial legacies.82 Thus, China-Japan-South Korea 
have created political structures that control economic forces, the iron-triangle of 
politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen. 83 This has allowed certain economic sectors, 
such as agriculture in Japan and South Korea, to have disproportionate influence on 
decision makers. The implications of sensitive sovereignty are that NEA states are averse 
to accepting WTO-plus FTAs, which are perceived as degrading the autonomy of the 
                                                 
77 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), 105. 
78 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Kindle edition (W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2014), Location 5596. 
79 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, 
no. 4 (1985): 15, doi:10.2307/2538540. 
80 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Location 5615. 
81 Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism, 12–13. 
82 Ibid., 13. 
83 Chalmers Johnson, “Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business 
Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,” in The Political Economy of the New Asian 
Industrialism, ed. Frederic C. Deyo, 1st edition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 136–64. 
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state. Therefore, a supra-national binding FTA in NEA, such as one that replicates ECSC 
standards and ties, would have to overcome immense institutional hurdles as well as 
deeply held beliefs about the role of the state. Of the three NEA states, only South Korea 
has shown that it is willing and capable of ratifying WTO-plus FTAs. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS: HYPOTHESES FOR A LACK OF 
PROGRESS TOWARD A TRILATERAL FTA 
There is a unique trajectory to China-Japan-South Korea economic cooperation 
that is guided by four overarching factors that tie together the literatures discussed above. 
First, trilateral economic cooperation is driven by private business concerns of efficiency 
and profit rather than state-led promotion of an E.U.-style regionalism. Specifically, 
TNC-driven FDI directed toward NEA global value chains provide both the glue and 
impetus for trilateral regionalism. Second, the political-economies of China-Japan-South 
Korea are highly influenced by certain economic sectors, such as agriculture, that weigh 
heavily on the internal bargaining process of FTA formation. Third, relative gains 
concerns influence the willingness of China-Japan-South Korea to cede market share for 
each other’s TNCs. Fourth, China-Japan-South Korea political and security-driven 
animosities act as forces that constrain states from advancing NEA economic regionalism 
from ad-hoc production links to a politically formalized economic unit. These four 
overarching factors pose potential explanations in regards to the limited progress toward 
a trilateral FTA, as follows. 
The first potential explanation is that if one of the three countries does not 
perceive a trilateral FTA as being an economic priority, then a trilateral FTA becomes 
less likely. Perception of the trilateral FTA as an economic priority depends on two 
factors. The first factor is whether or not China, Japan, and South Korea perceive 
minimal economic benefits from the trilateral FTA. The second factor involves the 
perceptions these countries have in regard to the economic benefits and feasibility of the 
other mega-FTAs, TPP and RCEP. Essentially, if any one of these countries perceives 
that TPP or RCEP provide more economic benefits than the trilateral FTA, and these 
other mega-FTAs seem to be a more feasible option, then the trilateral FTA will not be 
perceived as an economic priority.  
 19
The second potential explanation is that if influential domestic business interests 
are hurt by a China-Japan-South Korea FTA, then a trilateral FTA becomes less likely. If 
one singles out agricultural interests and assumes that China will always receive an 
agricultural output gain from a trilateral FTA, and that South Korean agriculture is no 
longer adverse to WTO-plus agreements, then the relative influence of Japanese 
agricultural interests can be identified as an important intermediate variable affecting 
FTA negotiation. For China, SOEs that are in sectors in which Japan and South Korea 
have a comparative advantage can also serve as an important intermediate variable 
affecting FTA negotiation. 
A third potential explanation is that if China-Japan-South Korea are motivated by 
relative gains, then a trilateral FTA becomes less likely. This follows from Japan–South 
Korean competition over market share of a growing Chinese domestic economy. While 
both want greater access and reach into the Chinese domestic economy without ceding 
any influence, Japanese and South Korean policy makers potentially could be stuck in a 
relative gains dilemma. Thus, the expected economic windfall for South Korea as 
compared to Japan from a trilateral FTA could be viewed as a negative influence on 
Japan’s willingness to cooperate. 
The fourth potential explanation is that if China-Japan-South Korea antagonisms 
in politics and security increase, then a trilateral FTA becomes less likely. Specifically, 
Japanese management of its wartime history and territorial disputes in regard to domestic 
opinion in China and South Korea is a key intermediate variable.  
Overall, these four explanations cover some of the more salient overarching 
factors that guide the trajectory of China-Japan-South Korea FTA and this thesis assess 
the relative causal strength of these explanations in understanding the elusiveness of the 
trilateral FTA.   
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design will assess the empirical evidence for each of the four 
potential explanations. Afterward, this chapter will summarize the strength of the 
empirical evidence provided by this thesis. 
The first potential explanation, that of a trilateral FTA as not being perceived as 
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an economic priority of one of the three countries, will be tested by determining whether 
or not TNC opinions concerning business operations in China-Japan-South Korea are 
averse to a trilateral FTA. In addition, how these groups and interests perceive the gains 
and viability of the other mega-FTAs will be assessed. If these private business opinions 
are averse to a trilateral FTA, then it can be predicted that such opinions should be 
reflected in economic and trade ministerial white papers and official statements, which 
have a vested interest in their national TNCs profitability. 
The second potential explanation, protectionist domestic business interests, can be 
tested by assessing the political strength of the agricultural lobby in Japan and South 
Korea, which represents the most influential set of economic interests opposing a 
trilateral FTA. Evidence of such strength includes the agricultural lobby successfully 
ensuring the passage of crop subsidies, protective tariffs, and provisions to previously 
ratified FTAs. For China, SOEs in certain sectors that could be negatively affected by the 
trilateral FTA would also serve as potential lobby groups similar to the agricultural 
groups in Japan and South Korea. 
The third potential explanation concerning relative gains over market share of the 
Chinese domestic economy can be tested by assessing Japanese-South Korean views of 
each other’s TNCs competing over the Chinese market. If relative gains are a concern, 
then it can be predicted that Japanese-Korean trade and economic ministries should 
advocate positions concerning regional competition similar to that of their national TNCs.  
The fourth potential explanation concerning China-Japan-South Korea political 
and security antagonisms can be tested by assessing whether or not these antagonisms 
affect the opinion of TNCs willingness to do business in on another’s countries. If private 
businesses view antagonisms as critical impediments, then it can be predicted that these 
views should also be reflected in white papers and official statements of each other’s 
trade and economic ministries.  
F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This paper finds that Japan is the least willing participant to push for progress 
toward a trilateral FTA. Japan as well as China perceives the trilateral FTA as not an 
economic priority. The explanation that best accounts for a lack of progress on the South 
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Korean side of the negotiating table is that South Korea currently views historical and 
political animosities as a roadblock for further economic relations with Japan. The 
following four sections provide a summary of the strength of evidence for each of the 
potential explanations. 
1. Strength of Evidence for Explanation 1: Not an Economic Priority 
There is strong evidence to show that the China-Japan-South Korea FTA is not a 
Japanese economic priority. Based on numerous statements and policy proposals, the 
largest and most influential business group in Japan, Nippon Keidanren, do not view the 
trilateral FTA as providing more potential economic benefits than that of TPP. 
Additionally, the Keidanren have primarily focused on ensuring that TPP negotiations 
progress so as to increase the viability of TPP. The Keidanren long-term view is that TPP 
is the best deal on the table, and that TPP can be used as the preferred benchmark to 
reach a future FTAAP-like agreement.  
Japanese economic ministries and organizations, such as the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) and the Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO), reflect similar opinions and strategies as the Keidanren. As expressed in METI 
and JETRO white papers, TPP is the gold standard of what an East Asian FTA can be 
whereas RCEP is a standard East Asian FTA. For METI and JETRO, the China-Japan-
South Korea FTA is framed as a potential pathway to RCEP, but not as providing any 
greater economic benefits or as being more feasible than RCEP. 
While there is evidence to show that South Korea does not perceive the trilateral 
FTA as an economic priority, the strength of this evidence is of neutral weight. South 
Korean business groups, such as the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) and the 
Korean International Trade Association (KITA), have voiced caution and concern for any 
potential FTA with Japan. Their pessimism, however, does not match the opinions of 
South Korean economic policy think tanks. In addition, none of South Korea’s diplomatic 
and economic ministries have voiced similar concerns regarding an FTA with Japan as 
FKI and KITA. While the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and the 
Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MoTIE) have prioritized RCEP and TPP 
participation over the trilateral FTA, they have done so as part of South Korea’s overall 
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FTA strategy to become a regional hub for the new mega-FTAs forming in the Asia-
Pacific. 
For China, there is strong evidence to support the explanation of the trilateral FTA 
as not being perceived as an economic priority for the PRC. Multiple Chinese economic 
policy experts have voiced the limited utility and feasibility of the China-Japan-South 
Korea FTA. Instead, these Chinese policy experts perceive greater opportunity from 
larger regional arrangements such as RCEP and TPP. Official PRC statements from the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) have echoed similar perceptions. Chinese FTA 
policy seeks to create both economically and politically competitive mega-FTAs vis-à-vis 
recent American efforts in regard to TPP, RCEP—and the recently announced proposals 
for FTAAP—provides for such needs, while the trilateral FTA has lost such economic 
utility. 
2. Strength of Evidence for Explanation 2: Negatively Affected Domestic 
Interests 
In Japan, domestic interest groups, such as the politically influential agricultural 
cooperative JA-Zenchu, are not necessarily opposed to a trilateral FTA. JA-Zenchu as 
well as the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) have 
common interests and have stated positions that align themselves toward being 
supportive of the trilateral FTA. This common position is prefaced on the assumption that 
China-Japan-South Korea FTA will contain agricultural carve-outs. Thus, interest groups 
such as JA-Zenchu and their political allies in MAFF see less threat from a trilateral FTA 
than from a potential WTO-plus TPP. 
South Korean agricultural groups, while influential, are not a strong enough force 
to a cause a lack of progress toward a trilateral FTA. Domestic agricultural interest 
groups such as the Korean Peasants League (KPL), have been effectively placated by 
South Korean pork barrel politics. KPL and similar groups are adeptly handled through 
key concessions by the South Korean government. 
In regard to the PRC, Chinese automobile, chemical, and general machinery SOEs 
are not a strong enough force to cause a lack of progress toward a China-Japan-South 
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Korea FTA. SOE interest and influence seems to have been effectively controlled by the 
PRC in that the CCP decides which SOE sector gets protection rather than the other way 
around. Additionally, SOE interests slowing the FTA is contingent on the final 
configuration of the China-Japan-South Korea FTA as either a WTO-plus or not WTO 
plus agreement. 
3. Strength of Evidence for Explanation 3: Competition over the Chinese 
Domestic Market 
As for Japanese TNCs perceiving a competitive threat from South Korean firms in 
the Chinese market, the perception of threat is not supported by the evidence presented in 
this paper. Japanese TNCs are more concerned with local Chinese competition than they 
are with South Korean market penetration. METI and JETRO have also echoed similar 
opinions to that of Japanese TNCs operating in China. 
As for KITA and FKI being concerned about competition with Japanese TNCs, 
MoTIE and MoFA have not registered the same concerns as these Korean business 
groups. There is a disjuncture between business interest groups in South Korea with their 
bureaucratic counterparts in the government that prevents this explanations from being 
strong enough to explain a lack of progress toward the China-Japan-South Korea FTA. 
In regard to the PRC being concerned about domestic competition by Japanese 
and South Korea TNCs, the evidence suggests that the PRC has an open mind, making 
this a neutral explanation. As detailed in Chapter V, the China-South Korea FTA has 
shown that China is willing to open certain state-dominated sectors to foreign 
competition. This willingness may have even wider implications concerning Chinese 
plans to move the economy away from export-oriented growth toward endogenous 
domestic-demand growth by facilitating the creation of efficient, competitive, and 
profitable industrial sectors. 
4. Strength of Evidence for Explanation 4: Concern over Historical and 
Political Animosities 
There is weak evidence for the fourth explanation of increased political-historical 
animosities affecting the Japanese so as to cause slow progress toward the trilateral FTA. 
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Evidence in concern of this explanation shows that the Keidanren has been driven in part 
by an attempt to overcome political-historical divides through economic interaction. The 
Keidanren have acted as middlemen for Japan between China and South Korea when 
relations have soured despite of poor public perceptions of China and South Korea at 
home. Additionally, Japanese TNCs have not registered negative impacts on business 
operations in either China or South Korea due to flare-ups in tensions. 
There is strong evidence for increased political-historical animosities affecting the 
South Koreans, and thus slowing progress toward the trilateral FTA. There is evidence to 
show that political, historical, and territorial grievances affected previous bilateral FTA 
negotiations with the Japanese. Additionally, such animosities have been strong enough 
to spoil Japanese and South Korean business-to-business relationships over an extended 
period. Coupled with a pessimistic and hostile opinion of the South Korean public, 
historical-political animosities have created a serious roadblock for future cooperation 
with Japan, even in the trilateral context.   
There is weak evidence for increased political-historical animosities affecting the 
Chinese so as to cause slow progress toward the trilateral FTA. Unlike South Korea, 
Sino-Japanese relations have remained stable despite historical-political flare-ups over 
the last 15 years. The ability of Keidanren to meet with Chinese business groups and 
political leaders have not been affected to the extent they have been in South Korea.  
G. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is divided into five additional chapters. The organization of these 
chapters is briefly outlined in this section. 
Chapter II draws out the evolution of the China-Japan-South Korea FTA from 
1999 onward within the context of both NEA economic regionalism and other competing 
mega-FTAs. The economic benefits and costs each country would incur if the trilateral 
FTA were successful are laid out in this chapter. Also, potential interest groups who 
particularly stands to win or lose in China, Japan, and South Korea from the trilateral 
FTA are identified. In addition, Chapter II provides a comparison of the benefits and 
costs of the trilateral FTA as compared to that of TPP and RCEP. Ultimately, these 
benefits and costs are conditional on the quality of the China-Japan-South Korea FTA. 
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Chapters III–V provide the empirical evidence that support the potential 
explanations that affect Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean decision-making toward the 
trilateral FTA. Each of these chapters frames the potential explanations in terms of the 
specific actors and interest groups at work in these countries. As the evidence is 
presented, strengths and weakness are assessed in order to determine which explanation 
is the strongest for each country.  
Chapter VI reviews the strength of the empirical evidence from the previous 
chapters and provides regional implications of the potential success or failure of the 
trilateral FTA. In particular, implications for the U.S. role in the region are explored vis-
à-vis NEA cooperation, and whether or not an exclusive trilateral FTA serves U.S. 
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II. EVOLUTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHINA-JAPAN-
SOUTH KOREA FTA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will provide a description of the evolution and development of the 
China-Japan-South Korea FTA, its current status, and the potential distribution of 
economic gains. The first section of this chapter will detail the overall origins and 
development of Northeast Asian economic cooperation evolving into the currently 
negotiated trilateral FTA. The development of the trilateral FTA occurred over three 
distinct periods that saw slow progress (1999–2009), then rapid progress (2009–2012), 
and now slow progress (2012-present) to reach an agreement. The second part of this 
chapter will detail the distribution of economic gains in terms of GDP, economic 
sector impacts, and how the trilateral FTA compares to the other mega-FTA 
initiatives, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP). Overall, the China-Japan-South Korea FTA grew out of a period 
when economic crises had pushed the Northeast Asian nations to cooperate on a more 
regular and deeper basis. In addition, the trilateral FTA came about when global trade 
liberalization had stalled in the WTO, and the countries of East Asia began forming 
regional multilateral alternatives. The China-Japan-South Korea FTA must now 
contend with the other mega-FTAs of RCEP and TPP in the region that offer their own 
unique gains for these Northeast Asian countries. Depending on the final configuration 
of the trilateral FTA, Japan seems to economically gain the least whereas China and 
South Korea gain the most. 
B. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRILATERAL FTA 
The development of the China-Japan-South Korea FTA can be separated across a 
timeline of three distinct periods. From 1999–2009, the trilateral FTA took shape in the 
form of proposals and studies within the context of greater East Asian cooperation. From 
2009–2012, the countries of China, Japan, and South Korea created more momentum to 
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start negotiations while other mega-FTAs were being proposed. Despite the burst of 
energy to get the three countries to sit down for negotiations, from 2013 onward there has 
been slow progress to reach an agreement. The following section will outline the origins 
and development of the trilateral FTA while putting this timeline within context of wider 
Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. 
1. Genesis of the FTA (1999–2009) 
The first joint announcement of a potential China-Japan-South Korea FTA was in 
1999 on the margins of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) annual meetings, in the form of the 
Trilateral Economic and Trade Ministers’ Meeting (TETM).84 The APT grouping of 
countries include ASEAN member states plus China, Japan, and South Korea. From 2002 
through 2009, China-Japan-South Korea worked on various initiatives that sought to 
create and strengthen financial and monetary regional institutions in the wake of the 
1997–8 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC).85 As a response to the AFC, the APT Executives’ 
Meeting of East Asia Pacific Central Banks, which was created prior to the AFC, was 
strengthened.86 Other institutions such as the APT Finance Minister Process was also 
strengthened and produced financial agreements such as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), 
CMI Multilateralization (CMIM), Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI), and APT 
Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO).87   
Within the context of growing regional financial and monetary cooperation, 
separate trilateral meetings outside of the APT TETM concerning investment and trade 
were being held concurrently from 2002 through 2009. During this time period, various 
trilateral venues were created outside of the APT forum that involved all three economic 
and foreign ministries on the track-one level. Such meetings were annual and included 
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the following: Yellow Sea Rim Economic and Technological Conference, Government 
Consultations on the Improvement of Business Environment, and the Trilateral Economic 
Director-General Meetings. In addition to the previously listed venues, separate track-one 
foreign minister and leadership Trilateral Summit Meetings began in 2007 and 2008 
respectively. 
The growing regional financial and monetary cooperation in East Asia also 
occurred during the time in which further multilateral trade liberalization through the 
WTO Doha Round collapsed. The Doha Round had promised to build on the previous 
multilateral reforms brought by the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994. The Doha 
Round of negotiations began in 2001 with an envisioned end date to negotiations by 
2005. Yet, gridlock in negotiations between countries over agricultural tariffs and 
subsidies failed to produce an agreement. The inability to pursue global multilateral trade 
liberalization through the WTO spurred East Asian countries to pursue regional bilateral 
and multilateral FTAs “as a substitute for [global] multilateral regulation.”88 As early as 
2004, China and Japan were conducting feasibility studies for proposing regional 
multilateral FTAs. In 2004, China proposed an East Asia FTA (EAFTA) that included the 
APT.89 In 2006, Japan proposed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia 
(CEPEA) that included the ASEAN+6 grouping of countries, which are the ASEAN+3 
states plus India, Australia, and New Zealand.90 Along with the China-Japan-South 
Korea FTA, these mega-FTAs in the East Asia region “symbolize[d] a shift away from 
the long-standing WTO/APEC framework.”91 
2. Maturation of the FTA (2009–2012) 
The 2002 through 2009 trilateral meetings outside of the APT forum of the TETM 
increased the level and amount of dialogue and cooperation, but official movement 
toward the China-Japan-South Korea FTA did not begin until 2009. The 2002–2009 
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period is best considered by regional observers as “a long warming-up period for the 
trilateral economic cooperation.”92 It was within the context of the 2009 second annual 
executive-level Trilateral Summit Meeting in which former Japanese Prime Minister 
Yukio Hatoyama pushed for an official joint study in concern of the trilateral FTA.93 The 
joint study on the trilateral FTA did not occur until May 2010 and concluded in 
December 2011 with the release of the complete trilateral report in March 2012. In 
November 2012 during the annual ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting (AEM), China-
Japan-South Korea announced that they would begin to pursue FTA negotiations.94  
From 2009 through 2012, China, Japan, and South Korea formalized trilateral 
economic cooperation through the creation of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat 
(TCS). During the 2009 second annual executive-level Trilateral Summit Meeting, the 
TCS was proposed and officially ratified by the three countries in 2011. As part of its 
mission, the TCS was mandated with promoting increased economic cooperation, 
regional development, people-people ties, environmental protection, and regional 
stability. In regard to economic cooperation, the TCS was tasked with pursuing the 
trilateral investment agreement as well as the trilateral FTA so that China, Japan, and 
South Korea may “continue to work toward further economic integration of the three 
countries in the long-term, including the establishment of a common market in the 
region.”95 With the completion of the trilateral FTA study in 2011, the signing of the 
2012 trilateral investment agreement, and the subsequent announcement of trilateral FTA 
negotiations beginning in the following year, the TCS had strong momentum from 2009 
through 2012 to attempt to achieve its various goals. Overall, 2009 through 2012 marked 
the high water period of trilateral economic cooperation in Northeast Asia. 
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Around this same time period, the mega-FTAs of TPP and RCEP began to gain 
traction in the region. TPP was originally known as the P4 FTA between Brunei, Chile, 
Singapore, and Malaysia in 2006. Later on in 2008, the U.S. joined the negotiations, and 
in the following years from 2009–2013, Australia, Canada, Mexico, Peru, Vietnam, and 
Japan joined TPP negotiations.96 In addition to TPP, there was also the formation of 
RCEP during the 2012 East Asia Summit (EAS), which includes the ASEAN+6 
countries.97 The intent of RCEP was to harmonize the two other mega-FTA proposals by 
China and Japan, EAFTA and CEPEA.98  
3. Recent Trilateral FTA Negotiations (2013 onwards) 
Trilateral FTA negotiations began in March 2013 and have continued with the 
seventh round in May 2015. The first two rounds of negotiations in March and August 
2013 were designed to establish the framework for future negotiations. Yet, the third and 
fourth rounds in November 2013 showed that all three sides had still failed at establishing 
a framework for negotiation.99 The disagreement centered on the scope of tariff 
reductions (trade liberalization) of whether or not the FTA should be a high or low 
quality FTA.100 During the fifth round of negotiations in September 2014, the three sides 
exhibited signs of progress with statements to the effect that the trilateral FTA should be 
concluded before the end of 2015.101 Yet, all three sides continued to fail at coming to 
                                                 
96 Murray Hiebert, Meredith Broadbent, and Lindsay Ross, “The Significance of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Negotiations,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 24, 2012, 
http://csis.org/publication/significance-trans-pacific-partnership-negotiations. 
97 Murray Hiebert and Liam Hanlon, “ASEAN and Partners Launch Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 7, 2012, 
http://csis.org/publication/asean-and-partners-launch-regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership. 
98 Ibid. 








101 China Daily, “Pact ‘Should Be Done by 2015,’” accessed February 11, 2015, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2014-09/02/content_18527797.htm. 
 32
any concurrence as to the scope of the FTA.102  At conclusion of the sixth round of 
negotiations in January 2015, the three sides remained deadlocked on issues of tariff 
reductions with the Japanese wanting more tariff lines eliminated than the Chinese and 
South Koreans.103 The latest round of negotiations occurred in May 2015 with little 
change in discussion from the previous meeting. According to the South Korean Trade 
Minister present at the meetings, “Negotiations for the South Korea-China-Japan FTA are 
moving more slowly than we have expected.”104 
4. Slow Progress Despite 13 Years of Incremental Cooperation 
Overall, trilateral cooperation from 1999 to 2012 has allowed for the evolution of 
the trilateral FTA from an idea to a potentially negotiated agreement. Cooperation during 
this time period had been consistent and incremental, and had been marked by high water 
achievements such as the creation of the TCS and the trilateral investment agreement. 
There is a clear desire by each country to continue economic cooperation. Despite of the 
consistent and incremental build-up that preceded the FTA, basic issues of the scope and 
quality of the FTA cannot be agreed upon. The next section will show the differences in 
economic gains depending on the quality of FTA as well as how the trilateral FTA stacks 
up against the other mega-FTAs of TPP and RCEP in order to better understand some of 
the fundamentals that could cause the slowdown in progress toward the China-Japan-
South Korea FTA. 
C. COMPARISON OF RELATIVE GAINS AND FTA STANDARDS 
1. Not all FTAs are Equal 
Opening a state’s economy to free trade pushes the potential GDP growth line 
above normal tariff-protected growth because free trade creates a virtuous cycle of more 
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efficient, productive, competitive, and profitable sectors. Despite the creation of more 
efficient and profitable sectors of a state’s economy, FTAs do not distribute economic 
gains equitably among partnering nations, nor are all FTAs the same quality of 
agreement. Besides distribution of gains between states, distribution of gains within each 
nation creates economic losers who can form interest groups that lobby against such 
FTAs. As noted by Mancur Olson, small and well organized interest groups—such as 
agricultural and industrial unions in developed nations—that stand to lose from an FTA 
will lobby for protection despite “reducing the efficiency and output of the society.”105 
This section will show how the China-Japan-South Korea FTA distributes economic 
gains as well as how the quality of the trilateral FTA affects the distribution of economic 
gains. Additionally, this section will compare how the trilateral FTA compares to TPP 
and RCEP, the region’s other mega-FTA initiatives. 
2. Who Gains More and Who Gains Less? 
According to the TCS, the China-Japan-South Korea FTA would increase GDP 
by an estimated .3%, .37%, and 3.55%, respectively.106 These gains are based off of 
complete tariff elimination but not complete NTB elimination—not a WTO-plus 
agreement. The GDP increase estimate for a separate Korea–Japan FTA was valued at 
1.09% and .02%, respectively, while estimates for a separate Korea–China FTA was at 
2.45–3.1% and .4%–.6%, respectively.107 A Japan-China bilateral FTA would give Japan 
a .36%–.66% GDP increase.108 Overall, South Korea would be the net winner in relative 
GDP gains followed by Japan and China, if these projections held true. 
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In addition to overall economic gains, each countries’ economic sectors would be 
affected differently. According to the TCS study, Chinese agriculture, textile, and 
electronics would benefit from the trilateral FTA, while its heavy industries would be 
out-competed by Japanese and South Korean peers (Figure 1). Japanese heavy 
industries—machinery, steel, automobiles, and chemicals—would benefit, but textile and 
agricultural sectors would experience decline (Figure 1). South Korean textiles, 
chemicals, and electronics sectors would benefit, but all other sectors would either 
decrease or see negligible effects from the FTA (Figure 1). Fewer South Korean sectors 
benefit from the trilateral FTA as compared to Japan and China. Even though fewer 
economic sectors stand to gain from the trilateral FTA in South Korea, those sectors are 
the most important to the South Korean economy, which is part of the reason why South 
Korea is projected as gaining the most in terms of GDP. 
Figure 1.  Sector Impacts from the Trilateral FTA 
 
From Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, “Free Trade Agreement,” 2013 Trilateral 
Statistics, accessed December 8, 2014, http://www.tcs-
asia.org/dnb/user/userpage.php?lpage=3_6_2_contents. 
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3. Low Quality vs. High Quality FTAs 
The ability of the trilateral FTA to distribute economic gains as well as affect 
particular sectors of the Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean economies depends on the 
quality of the FTA. FTAs are not uniform as they can possess differing trade-liberalizing 
qualities. High-quality FTAs produce agreements that liberalize trade beyond the current 
WTO multilateral agreements. Such high quality FTAs, often referred to as “WTO-plus” 
agreements, open up sectors to competition that have not been affected by the Uruguay 
Round.109 In addition to tariff reductions, WTO-plus FTAs eliminate non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) that limit the quantity of imports through quotas or voluntary export restraints 
(VERS), increase cost of getting product to market through excessive rules of origin 
(ROO), and domestic subsidies for particular industries. Low-quality FTAs are those 
agreements that merely lock in unilateral tariff reduction, maintain NTBs, preserve prior 
existing agreements, and include carve-outs and other exceptions.110 A higher quality 
trilateral FTA would magnify the relative gains and loses facing sectors. Previously 
signed bilateral FTAs with ASEAN (ASEAN+1 FTAs ) separately negotiated by China, 
Japan, and South Korea are low-quality FTAs that have yielded low levels of tariff 
liberalization (between 94% to 90% tariff elimination) and have not included non-tariff 
measures.111 Essentially, FTAs among East Asian states have tended to lock-in 
preexisting trade flows and value-added trade networks without opening previously 
protected sectors. 
If East Asian FTAs merely formalize the trade status-quo through low levels of 
tariff elimination, then existing trade patterns between China, Japan, and South Korea can 
indicate which state potentially stands to gain less, in terms of both economic and 
efficiency gains, from the trilateral FTA. According to Thomas Hale, there already exists 
a de-facto trade network among China, Japan, and South Korea that has been created by 
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unilateral tariff reductions.112 China, Japan, and South Korea have created a de-facto 
trade network that covers their value-added trade goods.113 As of 2012, China and South 
Korea have enjoyed preferential access into the Japanese non-agricultural market with 
68.8% and 54%, respectively, of all non-agricultural tariff lines reduced to duty-free.114 
Total tariff lines from China and South Korea that are duty-free are 52.4% and 36.5%, 
respectively.115 Additionally, Chinese and South Korean non-agricultural duty-free 
imports to Japan account for 73% and 64.6% of the value of all traded goods, 
respectively.116 Yet, Japan only receives 9.3% and 14.9% non-agricultural duty-free tariff 
lines from China and South Korea, respectively.117 Japan primarily exports non-
agricultural products to China and South Korea, on the order of over 99% of the value of 
all traded goods, and of the total value of non-agricultural goods imported by Japan from 
China and South Korea, 67.5% and 73.2% have tariffs levied, respectively.118 
The end result of the de-facto NEA trade network is a lopsided arrangement that 
benefits China and South Korea over Japan. Such an arrangement would be enhanced and 
elevated to de-jure status by a trilateral FTA along the lines of an ASEAN+1 FTA—a 
low quality FTA that locks in preexisting tariffs and NTBs. Considering Japan’s 
dwindling trade surplus with South Korea and ballooning trade deficit with China, 
Japan’s negative balance of payment in terms of traded goods would be locked in by a 
low quality trilateral FTA (Figure 2). Thus, in terms of reinforcing trade flows and 
creating efficient trade networks, Japan has the least to gain by a low quality trilateral 
FTA.  
                                                 
112 Thomas Hale, “The de Facto Preferential Trade Agreement in East Asia,” Review of International 
Political Economy 18, no. 3 (August 2011): 299–327, doi:10.1080/09692290.2010.484303. 
113 Ibid. 





118  World Trade Organization, “Tariff Profiles.” 
 37
Figure 2.  Balance of Payments (BoP) in Traded Goods in Millions of USD 
 
Balance of Payments in traded goods from JETRO and Bank of Korea statistics. 
The quality of the FTA will also affect whether countries will receive the full 
benefits of GDP gains as predicted, such as those predicted by the TCS joint study. The 
GDP gains cited by the TCS study are based on complete tariff elimination, but does not 
factor in elimination of NTBs.119 For instance, if Japan and China were to unilaterally 
forgo all their NTBs, their economies would receive a GDP boost of 1% and 3%, 
respectively.120 Thus, if the trilateral FTA were a high quality, WTO-plus agreement, 
then China, Japan, and South Korea could stand to gain more than the TCS study 
predictions. The implication in this scenario is that losing sectors in each economy would 
become more efficient, and the countries would receive greater economic welfare gains. 
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If the trilateral FTA is of a low quality, however, then the gains in terms of efficiency and 
welfare gains will be reduced depending on which tariff lines are eliminated.  
Additionally, the promises of economic gains from other mega-FTAs in the Asia-
Pacific detract from placing the China-Japan-South Korea FTA as a priority agreement. 
For Japan, TPP promises the most gains in terms of GDP growth due to American 
insistence on a high-quality Asia-Pacific FTA as compared to lower gains due to the 
likelihood that either the trilateral or RCEP FTA would have a low level of tariff 
liberalization similar to ASEAN+1 FTAs (Table 1). The recent conclusion of the China-
South Korea FTA, which has a 91% tariff elimination level and includes large sector 
carve-outs on both sides, confirms that a trilateral FTA would be a low quality FTA 
similar to that of an ASEAN+1 FTA.121 If the trilateral FTA is similar in form to the 
China-South Korea FTA, then complete tariff elimination will not occur and GDP gains 
for all three will be much lower than what the TCS predicted. Given that estimates on the 
lower end of Table 1 only assume complete tariff and not non-tariff measure elimination, 
a trilateral or RCEP agreement similar to the recent China-South Korea FTA would fall 
below the lower range of potential GDP growth gains. Thus, if Japan doubles down on 
trilateral FTA negotiations over TPP’s promises of a high-quality agreement, then Japan 
forgoes more gains in terms of potential GDP growth. As for China and South Korea, 
which are not included in TPP, the trilateral FTA could serve as a means for 
compensatory gains to balance potential losses in GDP due to a successful TPP.   
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Table 1.   Potential GDP Gains (%) 
 
Potential gains in terms of percent of GDP are listed from the currently negotiated 
trilateral FTA, TPP, and RCEP as well as a potential Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific 
(FTAAP). The lower range of values are potential gains from complete tariff elimination. 
The higher range of values are potential gains from complete tariff and non-tariff 
measures elimination. The values for the trilateral FTA are potential gains from only 
complete tariff elimination. These figures are a composite from TCS, PIIE, and RIETI 
figures.122 
D. CONCLUSION 
Overall, South Korea gains the most in terms of overall GDP from a trilateral 
FTA, and Japan gains the least. Yet, South Korea has more sectors negatively affected by 
the trilateral as compared to either China or Japan. When assessing the gains of low or 
high quality FTA, Japan stands to gain the least as well as perpetuate a negative balance 
of trade with China if Japan accepts a low quality trilateral FTA. On the flipside, a low-
quality trilateral FTA will lock-in existing trade patterns in Northeast Asia to the benefit 
of China. Additionally, Japan stands to gain the most with a high-quality TPP that has a 
stated aim of reducing NTBs vice a trilateral FTA that currently does not guarantee 
complete tariff elimination and does not reduce NTBs. Yet, the fallout of a successful 
TPP has a negative effect in terms of reduced GDP for China and South Korea, thus 
making a successful trilateral FTA more in their interest. 
Relative gains in terms of GDP is not the only reason for a lack of progress 
toward a trilateral FTA. All three countries’ ministries of foreign affairs still tout the 
economic gains as predicted by the TCS study. None of these governments have come 
out explicitly against or critical of the trilateral FTA. As established in Chapter I, there 
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are four potential explanations for why China, Japan, and South Korea have slow-rolled 
progress toward a trilateral FTA despite never overtly signaling displeasure with the 
FTA. Perceptions of the deal not being an economic priority, the power of influential 
domestic business interests negatively affected by the FTA, regional competition over 
China’s growing domestic market, and regional political-historical animosities play 
potential roles for slowing progress on all sides of the negotiating table. The following 
three chapters will analyze the causal strength of each of these explanations in each 
country to assess how the four factors affect slow progress toward the trilateral FTA.  
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III. JAPAN: TRILATERAL FTA NOT AN ECONOMIC PRIORITY 
FOR JAPAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will test four potential explanations on how Japan has approached 
the China-Japan-South Korea FTA that has caused a lack of progress in concluding 
negotiations. These explanations focus on Japanese perceptions of economic priority, 
domestic interests, foreign business competition, and political-historical grievances. The 
chapter will argue that the strongest reason for a lack of progress is that Japan does not 
view the trilateral FTA as an economic priority. After outlining the four potential 
explanations, the following sections will examine the evidence in order to test the causal 
strength of each explanation.   
B. EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS 
As detailed in Chapter I, there are four potential explanations that would cause 
each country to accept a lack of progress toward a China-Japan-South Korea FTA. This 
section will examine each of the four explanations that potentially motivate Japan in not 
pursing the trilateral FTA in order to show that Japan does not view the trilateral FTA as 
an economic priority. 
1. Explanation 1: Japanese Economic Priority 
The first potential explanation to be tested is if Japan does not view the trilateral 
FTA as an economic priority, then the China-Japan-South Korea FTA is less likely. For 
evidence, this explanation will assess the positions taken by the Japanese business 
advocacy group Nippon Keidanren. On the government side, positions taken by the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) as well as the related government-run 
Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) will be assessed. This section will show that 
Japanese business interests do not view the trilateral FTA as an economic priority relative 
to the other mega-FTAs in the Asia-Pacific. While the Keidanren have voiced support for 
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the trilateral FTA since 1999, they have more recently prioritized TPP, and their opinion 
on such economic priority has been echoed by METI and JETRO. 
a. Evidence: Keidanren’s view of Asia-Pacific FTAs 
(1) Prioritization of the WTO and the Doha Round 
From 1999 to 2005, the Keidanren consistently stated their support for the China-
Japan-South Korea FTA, but as a lower priority as compared to furthering global trade 
liberalization through the WTO. When the trilateral FTA was first proposed in 1999, the 
Keidanren supported a trade policy that focused Japan’s “efforts toward a new round of 
World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations [the Doha Round].”123 The Keidanren 
insisted that the WTO should be at the center of Japan’s trade policy while also pursuing 
regional FTAs. In a 1999 policy statement, the Keidanren emphatically stated that “one 
of the top priorities of Japan’s trade policy is strengthening the WTO system.”124 
Bilateral and regional FTAs were seen as a means of affecting future WTO negotiations. 
FTAs such as the trilateral FTA serve Japanese interest by strengthening “negotiating 
power in . . . WTO negotiations.”125 Support by Keidanren for regional FTAs from 1999 
to 2005 should be seen as part of a policy recommendation that maintained an emphasis 
on WTO expansion and greater trade liberalization. For the Keidanren, rules for allowing 
greater trade liberalization were to be created through the WTO and applied to regional 
FTAs. For instance, in 2001, the Keidanren stated that Japan must proceed with FTAs 
with not only China and South Korea, but also with the NAFTA countries and 
ASEAN.126 Keidanren chairman Kenji Miyahara’s 2004 statement supported the creation 
of a trilateral FTA but also “considering a free trade zone that compromises the members 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Japan, China and South Korea, as well 
                                                 
123 “Urgent Call for Active Promotion of Free Trade Agreements” (Tokyo, Japan: Nippon Keidanren, 
July 18, 2000), http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/2000/033/proposal.html. 
124 “Challenges for the Upcoming WTO Negotiations and Agendas for Future Japanese Trade Policy” 
(Tokyo, Japan: Nippon Keidanren, May 18, 1999), 
http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/pol102/proposal.html#part1. 
125 Ibid. 




as an FTA with the United States.”127 All of the WTO-plus rules created through the then 
proposed Doha Round would be applied to these FTAs. 
From 2006 onward, the priority of the WTO in the eyes of the Keidanren would 
diminish after a string of setbacks in Doha Round negotiations. Following the failure of 
the Doha Round to come to any agreement at the end of 2005, the Keidanren shifted its 
focus toward regional FTAs as means for creating WTO-plus rules in what the Keidanren 
saw as diminishing Japanese influence in the region. In a 2006 policy proposal, 
Keidanren registered concern that the failure of the Doha Round was causing “an erosion 
of confidence in the multilateral free trade system centered on the WTO.”128 In addition, 
the Keidanren noted that other regional countries—China and South Korea—were 
aggressively pursuing FTAs and “turning them into arenas of international 
competition.”129 At the same time as these comments, proposals for overlapping regional 
FTAs such as the Chinese promoted ASEAN+3 FTA (EAFTA) and the Japanese 
ASEAN+6 FTA (CEPEA) were being studied.130 The proposal suggested that “the 
conclusion of mutually beneficial EPAs [FTAs] particularly with East Asian neighbors . . 
. constitutes an indispensable condition for Japan as well as other Asian countries to 
develop together as the growth center of the world.”131 After the failure of the Doha 
Round to come to a conclusion in 2008, the Keidanren continued its trope of encouraging 
the Japanese government to prioritize FTAs, specifically mega-FTAs that would bind the 
entire Asia-Pacific region in-lieu of a WTO agreement in order to create new WTO-plus 
rules in the region.  
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(2) Shift toward prioritizing regional multilateral FTAs 
The greatest emphasis on recommending the China-Japan-South Korea FTA as a 
priority for Japanese trade policy would occur during 2010 and 2011. In the context of 
larger regional agreements such as EAFTA and CEPEA agreements, Keidanren saw the 
trilateral FTA as a necessary antecedent. In the run-up to the 2010 APEC meeting, the 
Keidanren put forward its vision of Japanese trade policy.132 In its policy proposal, 
Keidanren envisioned three parallel paths toward an overarching Asia-Pacific trade 
agreement. These paths included ASEAN+3 EAFTA, ASEAN+6 CEPEA, and TPP 
agreements as all necessary preconditions to the ultimate goal of an FTAAP, and each 
would be given equal priority. The China-Japan-South Korea FTA fit into this scheme 
under the ASEAN+3 track.133 A 2011 Keidanren policy proposal suggested that Japan 
should focus primarily on FTA promotion while still integrating WTO-plus rules from 
the moribund Doha Round.134 According to the proposal, Japan should prioritize the 
“conclusion of EPAs [FTAs] . . . through the frameworks of the TPP, ASEAN+6 
[CEPEA], and Japan-EU EIA, respectively.”135 Concurrent to the 2011 policy proposal, 
Keidanren issued a statement that the China-Japan-South Korea FTA would “fill a vital 
gap in East Asian economic integration and play a crucial role in achieving ASEAN+3 
and ASEAN+6 as well as in achieving APEC-level regional economic integration in the 
form of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP).”136 Thus, the Keidanren framed 
the trilateral FTA as a bridge to allow for the creation of EAFTA and CEPEA agreements 
in order to achieve the larger goal of FTAAP. 
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(3) Prioritization of TPP 
By 2012, however, the priority of the China-Japan-South Korea FTA as a 
necessary antecedent for proceeding along a multi-track approach toward FTAAP 
changed. A 2012 policy proposal specifically singled out TPP as leverage that could be 
used in Japan’s favor for promoting WTO-plus rules in negotiations for the China-Japan-
South Korea FTA and CEPEA.137 In addition, the Keidanren in 2013 altered its view of 
three parallel paths all leading to FTAAP. A 2013 policy proposal specifically called for 
pursuing “TPP as a route to creating a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), a 
Japan-China-Korea FTA, a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and 
a Japan-EU EPA.”138 There had been earlier statements by Keidanren in 2012 that 
described TPP “as a springboard for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia 
(CEPEA) framework, in the ultimate aim of creating a Free Trade Area of the Asia-
Pacific (FTAAP).”139 By 2013, a shift had occurred in which ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 
tracks, which as of 2013 were now embodied by RCEP rather than EAFTA and CEPEA, 
had been separated from the goal of creating an FTAAP. For the Keidanren, the ASEAN 
track through RCEP was now concerned with harmonizing trade rules for “supply chain 
and value chain continuity.140 TPP, according to Chairman Hiromasa Yonekura of 
Nippon Keidanren, “as the most promising route to creating a . . . FTAAP,” and called 
for an agreement to be reach as soon as possible.141 
Since 2012, Keidanren has placed priority on the TPP rather than on the China-
Japan-South Korea FTA. In Keidanren’s 2013 policy proposal, the trilateral FTA had 
been unpacked from the ASEAN track negotiations.142 Unlike its 2010 policy proposal 
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that saw the trilateral FTA as a stepping stone toward ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 trade 
agreements, the Keidanren no longer insisted that the trilateral FTA was a precondition 
for either RCEP or FTAAP from 2012 onward. Positions taken by Keidanren in 2010 and 
2011 were the closest pieces of evidence that suggested recommending Japan prioritize 
the China-Japan-South Korea FTA relative to other mega-FTAs. Based on Keidanren’s 
2012 policy proposal forward, the China-Japan-South Korea FTA as well as RCEP was 
now contingent upon the progress of TPP negotiations, and relatively not as prioritized as 
TPP. 
As early as 2010, Keidanren Chairman Hiromasa Yonekura had been issuing 
statements that preluded Keidanren’s formal policy proposals of prioritizing TPP over 
other regional trade agreements such as the trilateral FTA. In a November 2010 statement 
issued by Yonekura, he implored that Japan must “declare its participation in the TPP 
talks at the APEC summit,” or else be “left behind the world’s growth and prosperity.”143 
In the same statement, Yonekura clearly stated that Japan’s involvement in TPP would 
guide any future FTAs with China to include a trilateral FTA.144 Meeting with the 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2010, Chairman Yonekura advised that 
involvement with the TPP “would enhance Japan’s ‘strategic position’ and contribute to 
the promotion of FTA talks between Japan, China, and South Korea.”145 
Additionally, the Keidanren in its publications and statements has not affixed 
specific values in terms of economic welfare gains to the trilateral FTA or to TPP and 
RCEP. The Keidanren emphasizes certain macro-level promises that could result from 
these trade negotiations rather than quote specific valuations in welfare gain to the 
Japanese economy. The Keidanren have chosen to focus on TPP in terms of reforming 
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the Japanese domestic economy while furthering WTO-plus rules.146 RCEP enhances 
Japan’s access to regional value chains despite the presence or lack of presence of WTO-
plus rules.147 What the trilateral FTA offers is similar to that of RCEP in that it enhances 
regional value chains established by Japanese TNCs.148 Since 2012, however, the 
Keidanren has not clarified its position as to the priority of the trilateral FTA vis-à-vis 
RCEP. Recent statements by Chairman Yonekura, such as a May 2014 Japan–South 
Korea Business Conference in which he stated that the trilateral FTA would serve as the 
“foundation for wider economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region,” seem out of 
place when put in context with Keidanren policy proposals over the last three years.149 
No Keidanren policy proposal or statement has made the trilateral agreement contingent 
to Japanese goals of furthering WTO-plus rules, effecting domestic economic changes, or 
enhancing regional trade flows. What comes first for the Keidanren in order to enhance 
regional value chains, RCEP or the China-Japan-South Korea FTA, remains an open 
question.  
(4) Keidanren’s Position in Review 
Since the trilateral FTA’s proposal in 1999, the Keidanren have, for the most part, 
subordinated the China-Japan-South Korea FTA in priority relative to other trade 
agreements. In the first half of the 2000s, the Keidanren were focused on accelerating the 
Doha Round of the WTO in order to create new WTO-plus rules. After 2008 and 
specifically during the years of 2010 and 2011, the Keidanren was the most vocal about 
pursuing the trilateral FTA as a priority in order to achieve the larger goals of CEPEA, 
EAFTA, and FTAAP. From 2012 and onward, the Keidanren have subordinated in 
priority the China-Japan-South Korea FTA in order to focus on TPP negotiations, which 
it sees as giving Japan significant leverage in negotiating the trilateral FTA, RCEP, and 
the terms of a future FTAAP. The shift in priority has tracked with what the Keidanren 
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has believed to be the best means to achieve WTO-plus rules in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The Keidanren’s period of support for the China-Japan-South Korea FTA should be seen 
within the context of an intermediate period following the stagnation of the Doha Round 
and the emergence in confidence of the TPP to create WTO-plus rules. As the Keidanren 
do not currently perceive the trilateral FTA as endogenously producing WTO-plus rules, 
the priority for this FTA is lower relative to that of TPP.  
b. METI and JETRO Policy Position 
(1) Echoing Concerns of Keidanren 
The opinions of the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 
and the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) are key to understanding because 
they provide the economic research and policy creation for the Japanese government. 
These actors in the Japanese bureaucracy are connected to their business counterparts in 
the private sector in an iron-triangle of politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen.150 
METI and JETRO have followed suit with Keidanren in the last two years. The 2013 
JETRO White Paper emphasized the singular importance of the TPP in that it “signaled 
the arrival of the mega FTA.”151 By 2014, JETRO and METI white papers listed the 
China-Japan-South Korea FTA as part of the larger RCEP agreement as well as 
highlighting the importance of TPP. The 2014 METI White Paper had an anemic 
description of the China-Japan-ROK FTA. METI gives a half page to the trilateral FTA 
as compared to the six pages for TPP and three pages for RCEP negotiations, and simply 
describes the trilateral negotiations as “lively discussions” that are “progressing 
steadily.”152 The 2014 JETRO White Paper states that the “mutual complement of the 
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TPP and RCEP contributes toward the realization of . . . FTAAP.”153 Similar to 
Keidanren insistence that Japan use TPP negotiations to affect the tone of other regional 
negotiations, the JETRO paper states that Japan’s involvement in the TPP can be used to 
“raise the levels of liberalization of RCEP.”154 
Similar to the Keidanren, METI and JETRO characterize the benefits of the 
mega-FTAs not in terms of absolute economic welfare gains, but rather, in terms of 
potential macroeconomic benefits such as WTO-plus rule making and strengthening 
preexisting value-chains. According to the 2014 METI White Paper, “TPP is an 
ambitious attempt . . . creating new rules covering not only high-level tariff elimination,” 
but also WTO-plus rules.155 In regard to RCEP, the METI white paper says RCEP would 
bring about “the standardization of rules and streamlining of procedures . . . and provide 
support for the overseas expansion of Japanese industry” without necessarily including 
WTO-plus rules.156 In an identical fashion, the 2014 JETRO White Paper frames TPP as 
“oriented toward the establishment of high-level rules,” whereas RCEP creates “business-
friendly framework in as aspects such as supply-chains.”157  
The METI and JETRO white papers, however, do not explicitly state a particular 
benefit of the China-Japan-South Korea FTA in similar terms as TPP or RCEP. METI 
refers to the previous joint studies already discussed in Chapter II with an opaque final 
statement that the trilateral FTA should be concluded as a “comprehensive, high-level 
agreement.”158 The 2014 JETRO White Paper frames the China-Japan-South Korea FTA 
in a completely different light as being a necessary part of the Japanese government’s 
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goal to conclude FTAs that will cover more than 84% of Japan’s trade as opposed to the 
current FTA trade coverage of 18.2%.159 
c. Summary of Evidence and Analysis 
Overall, Keidanren, METI, and JETRO do not currently view the trilateral FTA 
as an economic priority for Japan. TPP as opposed to RCEP and the China-Japan-South 
Korea FTA holds priority as TPP negotiations are perceived as delivering regional 
leveraging power as well as future structural benefits to the Japanese economy. RCEP is 
prioritized over the trilateral FTA as RCEP is perceived as providing greater FTA trade 
coverage that will strengthen existing Japanese TNC value-chains. The trilateral FTA, 
however, from the standpoint of the Keidanren, METI, and JETRO, provides identical 
benefits of providing for FTA trade coverage as RCEP. Yet, both the conclusion of RCEP 
and the China-Japan-South Korea FTA are contingent on the trajectory of TPP 
negotiations in order to create a precedent for WTO-plus rules in the region.  
2. Explanation 2: Japanese Agricultural Interest 
The second potential explanation to be tested is if Japanese agricultural interests 
do not view the trilateral FTA as in their best economic interest, then the China-Japan-
South Korea FTA is less likely. For evidence, this explanation will assess the position 
taken by the biggest and most politically influential Japanese agricultural cooperative, 
JA-Zenchu. Similar to Explanation 1 and the influence of the Keidanren on METI, the 
opinion of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) will be analyzed 
to see if it follows JA-Zenchu’s views in regard to the trilateral FTA. Specifically, this 
section will show that JA-Zenchu has a favorable view of the trilateral FTA as a hedge 
against the TPP, and that such an opinion is shared by MAFF. Due to the similar of 
opinions between JA-Zenchu and MAFF on the utility of the China-Japan-South Korea 
FTA, Explanation 2 provides little explanatory power for a lack of progress toward the 
trilateral FTA. The following section will detail the positions taken by JA-Zenchu in 
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regard to both the TPP and the trilateral FTA, and then show how MAFF has mirrored 
JA-Zenchu’s position despite recent reforms.  
a. Evidence: JA-Zenchu Position 
(1) Trilateral FTA as a Hedge Against TPP 
In an opposite position to that of Keidanren, the JA-Zenchu has been steadfast in 
its opposition to free trade deals. Similar to Keidanren, JA-Zenchu views TPP as a major 
catalyst and has reacted in response to the Japanese government’s involvement in TPP. 
When the Japanese government under the Kan administration considered joining TPP, the 
then JA-Zenchu President made it clear that he was “absolutely against Japan taking part 
of the TPP.”160 Upon Japan’s involvement in TPP negotiations, JA-Zenchu President 
Banzai maintained his group’s position that “TPP talks will damage Japan’s national 
interests.”161  
JA-Zenchu’s position on the China-Japan-South Korea FTA, unlike Keidanren, is 
much harder to assess through direct comments in open source material. JA-Zenchu’s 
maintains a strict belief that Japanese free trade agreements should have carve-outs for 
agriculture.162 Some MAFF officials have voiced support for the China-Japan-South 
Korea FTA because it would likely exclude agriculture. The exclusion of such 
agricultural goods would lower the quality of the trilateral FTA. According to an 
unnamed MAFF official, the trilateral FTA was advantageous in that such an agreement 
could be “concluded without the complete liberalization of rice and other products.”163 
To date, no spokesman for JA-Zenchu has come out in support of a trilateral FTA. Yet, 
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neither has JA-Zenchu come out against the trilateral FTA similar to their opposition to 
TPP. 
Overall, so long as the China-Japan-South Korea FTA does not include significant 
agricultural tariff lines, this paper assess that JA-Zenchu would be supportive of the FTA. 
TPP negotiations that contain possible compromises to Japanese rice, wheat, diary, sugar, 
and pork will sufficiently incentivize JA-Zenchu to advocate an alternative FTA. 
b. Evidence: MAFF Opinion of Trilateral FTA 
(1) Echoing JA-Zenchu Position on FTAs 
MAFF’s policies have consistently reflected a majority of the positions taken by 
JA-Zenchu that preclude FTAs that threaten Japanese agriculture. Since the LDP took 
power, MAFF ministers have been supportive of the TPP while maintaining that certain 
agricultural products—specifically rice, wheat, diary, and sugar—should be exempted. In 
May 2013, MAFF Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi, prior to beginning TPP negotiations, 
made clear that Japan would not “accept the reduction or elimination of the tariff [on 
rice].”164 In May 2014, the incoming MAFF minister, Koya Nishikawa, declared that 
“the TPP is the most important pillar of Mr. Abe’s growth strategy,” but remained firm 
on protecting most of Japan’s agricultural sectors.165  
The tenure of Nishikawa in MAFF has led to reforms aimed at JA-Zenchu as part 
of Abe’s structural reform initiative.166 In February 2015, Nishikawa successfully led the 
charge against JA-Zenchu and removed its authority to audit and guide all Japanese 
farming cooperatives, removing a coercive tool to influence famers and collect votes.167 
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Nishikawa, however, stepped down at the end of February 2015 in response to allegations 
of his acceptance of campaign donations from sugar and timber companies.168 He has 
been replaced by the previous minister, Yoshimasa Hayashi, who is less capable of 
countering the influence of JA-Zenchu. Despite a recent reformist blip under the tenure of 
Nishikawa, MAFF policies should continue to reflect JA-Zenchu concerns over free trade 
agreements. 
c. Summary of Evidence and Analysis 
Overall, this section assesses that JA-Zenchu and MAFF have articulated similar 
positions and favor the trilateral FTA under the assumption that it will have carve-outs 
for sensitive agricultural goods. As both would agree that the trilateral FTA is in the best 
interest of Japanese agriculture, Explanation 2 does not account for a lack of progress 
toward the China-Japan-South Korea FTA.  
3. Explanation 3: Japanese Concerns of South Korean Relative Gains in 
the Chinese Market 
The third potential explanation to be tested is that if Japan is concerned by 
competition over China’s domestic market with South Korean TNCs, then the China-
Japan-South Korea FTA is less likely. This explanation will show that while the 
Keidanren are concerned that South Korean TNCs are receiving favorable trade 
conditions with China, Japanese TNCs are not registering South Korean TNCs as their 
primary competitor in the Chinese market. Also, Japanese TNC opinions are reflected in 
recent METI and JETRO White Papers. Due to the lack of competitive threat seen by 
Japanese TNCs, METI, and JETRO, Explanation 3 does not account for the lack of 
progress toward a China-Japan-South Korea FTA. 
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a. Evidence: Keidanren’s Opinion 
The Keidanren has been vocal over its concern that South Korean firms are 
receiving more favorable trade conditions due to South Korea’s success in concluding 
FTAs. Currently, 18.9% of Japan’s trade is covered by FTAs whereas 35.4% of South 
Korea’s trade is covered by trade agreements.169 When the newly signed China–South 
Korea FTA is ratified and comes into force, 55.6% of South Korea’s trade will be 
covered by FTAs.170 The widening gap in coverage has been commented on by 
Keidanren as a potential competitive threat to Japanese overseas business operations. The 
Keidanren began sounding the alarm in 2009 while South Korea was negotiating dual 
FTAs with the U.S. and E.U. simultaneously.171 When KORUS negotiations were 
concluded in 2011, Keidanren emphasized the need to sign FTAs with Japan’s major 
markets to prevent a loss of market share due to South Korean competition.172 
Yet, recent Keidanren policy statements on how Japan should redress the Korean 
FTA advantage does not single out the China-Japan-South Korea FTA as the solution to 
the Korean competitive advantage in FTAs. While Keidanren believes that Japan must 
improve “access to the Chinese market,” it does not believe that the trilateral FTA will 
provide the solution to Japan’s dearth of FTA coverage.173 In a 2013 Keidanren policy 
statement, the advocacy group asserted that “TPP participation is essential to redressing 
the unfavorable competitive conditions Japan faces compared to countries such as South 
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Korea and restoring and enhancing Japan’s competitiveness through establishment of 
trade rules.”174  
b. Evidence: Japanese TNCs Opinion 
Unlike the Keidanren, however, Japanese TNCs in China have yet to perceive 
South Korean competition as the most significant threat. Based on surveys from the state-
sponsored Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC), only 11% of Japanese TNCs 
in China viewed South Korean firms as their main competitors in 2014, a 1% increase 
from 2010 (Figure 3). During this same time period, 36% of Japanese companies viewed 
domestic Chinese firms as their stiffest competitors in China, a 3% increase from 2010 
(Figure 3). When asked to compare effectiveness of sales power in the Chinese market 
between Japanese and South Korean companies, Japanese firms have showed a decrease 
in their view of South Korean sales power (Figure 4). In 2014, Japanese companies 
viewed South Korean competitors as having less sales power than themselves in the 
Chinese market. Overall, the 2014 JBIC survey confidently concludes that “in sales 
power evaluation of competitors, Chinese and Korean companies are declining.”175 
Figure 3.  Perception of Intense Competition in Chinese Market  
by Japanese Businesses 
 
Japanese TNC competition opinion compiled from JBIC Annual Business and Investment 
Surveys: http://www.jbic.go.jp/en. 
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The low level of perception of South Korean competitive threat and decreasing 
perception of South Korean competitive sales power by Japanese firms in the Chinese 
market also decreases the perception that South Korean firms would have greater relative 
gains than Japanese ones if there were a trilateral FTA. Considering that a China-Japan-
South Korea FTA would allow for equal access to the Chinese market among Japanese 
and South Korea firms, then one can assume that preexisting levels of competition and 
sales power should be accentuated. Specifically, sales power of either Japanese or South 
Korean TNCs should be amplified by a trilateral FTA, and thus, increase relative gains in 
favor of South Korean firms. The decrease in South Korean TNC sales power in China, 
as noted in Figure 3, indicates that Japanese TNCs would not necessarily view a China-
Japan-South Korea FTA as increasing relative gain disparities to the favor of their South 
Korean counterparts.  
c. Evidence: METI and JETRO Policy Opinion 
JETRO, more so than METI, has articulated similar positions as the Keidanren 
and Japanese TNCs in that Japan suffers from a dearth of competitive FTAs and that 
South Korean competition is not a motivating factor. The 2014 METI White Paper stated 
that in light of Japan’s consecutive trade deficits, a diminished current account surplus, 
and lack of FTA coverage, “it is becoming increasingly important to enhance the business 
environment both within Japan and overseas, in order to bolster the competitiveness of 
Japanese industry.”176 Yet, official METI position does not indicate that a China-Japan-
South Korea FTA takes precedence in addressing these concerns. Similar to Keidanren, 
JETRO sees qualitative differences between TPP and RCEP in that “TPP is oriented 
toward the establishment of high-level rules, while the RCEP seeks to create a business-
friendly framework in aspects such as supply chains.”177  
Neither METI nor JETRO registered any concerns about competition with Korean 
TNCs in the Chinese market in their 2013 and 2014 white papers. Similar to the 2014 
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JBIC survey, the 2014 METI White Paper was confident about the resurgence in 
Japanese TNC competiveness, especially in Asia.178 Besides increased sales in ASEAN, 
METI focused on the growth of Japanese affiliates in China as an indicator of the robust 
presence and optimism of Japanese TNCs in China.179 
d. Summary of Evidence and Analysis 
Overall, METI and JETRO, similar to Japanese TNCs, do not currently perceive a 
Korean competitive threat in the Chinese market if a China-Japan-South Korea FTA was 
concluded. Similar to the Keidanren, JETRO and METI do not view the trilateral FTA as 
redressing South Korea’s competitive edge in FTAs. The greatest threat for Japanese 
TNCs operating in China is not South Korean competitors, but rather, the increase in 
Chinese domestic competition and the economic slowdown of the Chinese economy as it 
conducts structural reforms.180 Thus, a South Korean competitive threat acting as a drag 
force on the Japanese side of the negotiating table does not account for a lack of progress 
toward a trilateral FTA. 
4. Explanation 4: Japanese Concern for Political-Historical Animosities 
The fourth potential explanation to be tested is that if historical and political 
grievances negatively affect the economic relationship between China-Japan-South 
Korea, then a trilateral FTA is less likely. Japanese TNCs in Northeast Asia have had to 
operate in an often politically antagonistic environment. Recent antagonisms include riots 
in China against Japan in 2005 and 2012, the collision of a Chinese trawler and Japanese 
Coast Guard vessel near the Senkakus in 2010, South Korean protests over Takeshima / 
Dokdo, and occupation legacy issues with South Korea. This section will argue that 
Japanese TNCs and the Keidanren do not view political-historical animosities as a deal-
breaker in the Sino-Japanese economic relationship, but they due view such factors as 
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having a constraining effect on the Japanese-South Korean economic relationship. The 
mixed perception of the significance of historical and political grievances in the trilateral 
relationship makes such grievances a weak explanation for a lack of progress toward the 
trilateral FTA. 
a. Evidence: Sino-Japanese Relations 
The 2005, 2010, and 2012 Sino-Japanese events that led to heightened tensions 
between the two countries did not have an appreciable effect on Japanese TNCs ability to 
do business in China. Surveys by JBIC indicate that Japanese TNCs are more worried 
about factor-driven concerns than they are about political considerations when 
determining their three-year, medium term outlook of operations in China (Figure 4). The 
rising cost of labor in China is more of a concern for Japanese TNCs than political 
instability even during politically tense years (Figure 4). Additionally, during the specific 
years of 2005, 2010, and 2012, a majority of Japanese TNCs did not plan to alter their 
medium term outlook or pull out of China (Figure 5).  
Figure 4.  Medium Term Prospects for Japanese Overseas 
 Business Operations in China 
 
Medium term Japanese TNC opinion surveys compiled from JBIC Annual Business and 
Investment Surveys: http://www.jbic.go.jp/en.  
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Figure 5.  Effect of Recent Tensions on Three-Year Business Plans in China 
 
Japanese business medium term opinions based on reaction to political events compiled 
from JBIC Annual Business and Investment Surveys: http://www.jbic.go.jp/en. 
In addition, the ability of the Keidanren to liaison with its counterparts in China 
has not suffered significantly due to political tensions. Following the 2012 riots, 
Keidanren’s business expos in China were cancelled, however, Keidanren was still able 
to liaison with Chinese officials and business counterparts. Starting in February 2013, 
Keidanren has consistently met with former and current CCP officials as well as Chinese 
business leaders.181 Yet, unlike previous Chinese presidents and premiers, neither Xi 
Jinping nor Li Keqiang have met with the Keidanren.182  
The opinion of the Keidanren and Japanese TNCs concerning bilateral relations 
with China, however, does not match overall Japanese public opinion. In a 2014 Pew 
Research Center poll of how Asian countries view on another, 68% of Japanese 
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respondents agreed with the claim that China posed the greatest threat toward Japan.183 
On the question of whether or not Sino-Japanese territorial disputes “could lead to a 
military conflict,” 85% of Japanese respondents registered concern that such a scenario 
could occur.184 In regard to the question of whether or not one thinks that “China’s 
growing economy is a good thing or a bad thing for our country,” 39% of Japanese said it 
was good for Japan and 47% responded that it was a bad.185 In terms of whether or not 
the Japanese public has “confidence in [Chinese President] Xi to do the right thing in 
world affairs,” a majority of Japanese, 87%, had no confidence.186 In addition, only 7% 
of Japanese respondents held favorable views of China.187 Overall, public sentiment 
toward China is dramatically opposite from that of Sino-Japanese business sentiment. 
b. Evidence: Japanese–South Korean Relations 
The Keidanren has had a mixed experience with the South Korean government 
and its Korean business counterparts. Following disputes over the issues of comfort 
women, Takeshima/Dokdo, and occupation reparations, Keidanren and the Federation of 
Korean Industries (FKI) stopped holding their annual summits in 2007 after 23 years of 
bilateral cooperation.188 In addition, efforts by citizen’s groups to prosecute Japanese 
TNCs in South Korean courts for occupation reparations have deepened the divide. A 
2013 South Korea Supreme Court ruling ordered Nippon Steel to pay reparations for 
forced work during the Japanese occupation.189 The Keidanren characterized the ruling 
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as creating “obstacles” to the Japanese-South Korean economic relationship.190 The 
ruling has been followed by another successful case in October 2014 against a Japanese 
TNC.191  
The relationship between the Keidanren and South Korea has recently 
normalized. In December 2014, after a seven-year freeze, Keidanren and FKI resumed 
their annual summit and promised to work together toward a China-Japan-South Korea 
FTA. Following the meeting, the Keidanren met with President Park Geun-hye, a first 
under the Park administration.192 It would seem that the Keidanren’s consistent support 
for trilateral cooperation toward the China-Japan-South Korea FTA paid its dividends 
and allowed for the rapprochement between itself and the South Korean government. 
Improving relations between the Keidanren, FKI, and the South Korean 
government, however, do not match Japanese public opinion toward South Korea. In a 
2015 public opinion poll conducted by Genron NPO concerning Japanese views of South 
Korea, most Japanese have an unfavorable view of South Korea.193 According to the 
poll, 52.4% of Japanese view South Korea unfavorably, while only 23.8% held a 
favorable view.194 Of those who held a negative view of South Korea, the top two 
reasons for such a view was due to South Korean “criticism of Japan over historical 
issues,” and “continuing confrontation over Takeshima.”195 In regard to what issues 
should be a priority for the Japan–South Korea bilateral relationship, only 3.8% of 
respondents agreed on promoting “how to strengthen cooperative relations on trade and 
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investment and create a free trade zone.”196 Despite negative opinions due to historical 
and territorial claims, nearly half of Japanese surveyed (49.5%) agreed that “economic 
growth in South Korea is both beneficial and necessary to Japan.”197 The previous two 
polls conducted confirm an annual increase in positive views by Japanese that South 
Korean economic wellbeing is mutually beneficial for the two countries.198 In addition, 
67.8% of Japanese respondents admit that the Japan–South Korea relationship is on the 
wrong track and the relationship needs to be improved.199 
c. Summary of Evidence and Analysis 
Overall, Japanese TNCs and the Keidanren do not consider historical and political 
animosities as serious impediments to the Sino-Japanese relationship, but they have in the 
recent past seen these animosities as constraining the Japan-South Korea relationship. 
Sino-Japanese business relations have fared better than Japanese-South Korean business 
relations, but the latter seems to be on the mend. The Keidanren is sensitive to the 
fluctuations in political-historical grievances and acts as an active intermediary unlike its 
South Korean and Chinese counterparts. While being able to meet with Chinese officials 
during periods of heightened political tension seems like a low bar to pass, such an ability 
to maintain dialogue should be contrasted to that of the Keidanren in South Korea over 
the last eight years. The deep freeze in which the Keidanren were placed in South Korea 
from 2007 to 2014 speaks to the ability of negative public opinion to shape what should 
be a purely economic relationship. At the same time, the autonomy of the Keidanren to 
show the initiative and meet with their Chinese and South Korean counterparts shows an 
ability to act despite of negative public opinion at home. This autonomy from negative 
public opinion is not seen by Keidanren’s regional partners, especially in regard to 
Keidanren’s counterparts in South Korea. 
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C. FINAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
Japan’s perception that the China-Japan-South Korea FTA is not an economic 
priority is one of the strongest drag forces of the four examined on the Japanese side of 
the negotiating table. The other three explanations do not account for the lack of progress 
toward the trilateral FTA. So long as the Keidanren and METI view TPP as the best deal 
on the table to reach FTAAP, the China-Japan-South Korea FTA will remain as a lower 
priority. 
In regard to the second explanation of Japanese agricultural interests causing a 
lack of progress, JA-Zenchu and MAFF have common interests and have stated positions 
that align themselves toward being supportive of the trilateral FTA. This common 
position is prefaced on the assumption that the China-Japan-South Korea FTA will 
contain agricultural carve-outs. So long as JA-Zenchu remains a politically salient force 
in Japanese politics, it will influence the FTA decisions currently being made by the LDP 
administration.  
As for the third explanation of Japanese TNCs perceiving a competitive threat 
from South Korean firms in the Chinese market, the perception of threat is not supported 
by recent Japanese business opinion surveys. The LDP’s Three Arrows program has had 
a noticeable effect on the optimism of Japanese firms as well as endogenous Japanese 
business reforms that have increased their overall competiveness as compared to their 
Korean counterparts.  
Finally, the fourth explanation of political-historical animosities to cause the 
Japanese to drag their feet on the trilateral FTA has actually had the opposite effect. The 
activity and the willingness to cooperate trilaterally by the Keidanren has been driven in 
part by an attempt to overcome political-historical divides. The Keidanren have acted as 
middlemen for Japan between China and South Korea when relations have soured despite 
of poor public perceptions of China and South Korea at home. Additionally, Japanese 
TNCs have not registered negative impacts on business operations in either China or 
South Korea due to flare-ups in tensions. 
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IV. SOUTH KOREA: LACK OF PROGRESS DUE TO POLITICAL 
AND HISTORICAL GRIEVANCES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since 2001, South Korea has pursued an aggressive government-led policy of 
simultaneous, bilateral trade negotiations that now covers 61% of all South Korean 
trade.200 South Korea has also attempted to join the various mega-regional FTAs that are 
being negotiated in the Asia-Pacific as part of its overall FTA policy of turning South 
Korea into the FTA lynchpin of the Asia-Pacific. South Korea’s policy has resulted in 
FTAs with all of its major trading partners—ASEAN, U.S., E.U., and China—excepting 
Japan. Negotiations for a bilateral Japan-South Korea FTA in 2004 and 2005 floundered 
during an intense period of anti-Japanese sentiment in South Korea. Such sentiment has 
continued to be an influential force in South Korean domestic politics as well as in the 
Japan-South Korea bilateral relationship. While examining the four potential explanation 
for a lack of progress toward a China-Japan-South Korea FTA—which include South 
Korean perceptions of economic priority, domestic interests, foreign business 
competition, and political-historical grievances—this chapter will show that political and 
historical animosities still remain the strongest reason for a lack of progress toward a 
trilateral FTA that involves Japan.    
B. EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS 
As detailed in Chapter I, there are four potential explanations that would cause 
each country to accept a lack of progress toward a China-Japan-South Korea FTA. This 
section will outline each of these four explanations that potentially motivate South Korea 
in pursing the trilateral FTA. 
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1. Explanation 1: South Korea Economic Priority 
The first potential explanation to be tested is if South Korea does not view the 
trilateral FTA as an economic priority, then the China-Japan-South Korea FTA is less 
likely. For evidence, this explanation will assess the positions taken by South Korean 
business advocacy groups, Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) and the Korean 
Industry Trade Association (KITA). On the government side, positions taken by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy 
(MoTIE) will be assessed. Specifically, this section will show that neither FKI, KITA, 
MoFA, nor MoTIE view the trilateral FTA as an economic priority. In order to assess the 
opinion of these various actors, the following section will outline potential benefits that 
should entice these actors and show that none of these actors view those benefits as 
sufficient when compared to their interest in other mega-FTAs, such as TPP and RCEP. 
a. Evidence: FKI and KITA Position on Trilateral FTA 
(1) Support for an FTA with Japan to Affect Structural Change 
A potential motivation for South Korean business groups and government to 
pursue a trilateral FTA is the potential to combat significant structural problems, such as 
labor market efficiency, and keep Japanese-styled secular stagnation at bay, all of which 
are issues identified by these actors. In a December 2014 survey by FKI of Korean 
economists, fears of secular stagnation were on the minds of the majority South Korean 
economists and academics.201 An additional 2014 survey by FKI of domestic businesses 
reported that 86% believe that Korean “manufacturing and export[s] were trapped in a 
structural crisis.”202   
According to some South Korean economic think-tanks, an FTA with Japan could 
combat structural problems and avoid secular stagnation by increasing Korean TNC 
efficiency and competiveness. According to a 2012 Korean Institute for Economic Policy 
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(KEIP) statement concerning the trilateral FTA, such an FTA regardless of various levels 
of tariff liberalization would “benefit [South Korea] immensely, more than China or 
Japan” by lowering trade barriers with Japan. 203 Additionally, the KEIP analysis pointed 
out that any FTA with Japan would benefit the “petrochemical, machinery, and 
electronics sectors of the South Korean economy.”204 In a 2013 KEIP working paper 
concerning a Japan-South Korea FTA, KEIP stressed that an FTA with Japan would 
address some of South Korea’s structural problems as well as allow Korea to enjoy 
“greater benefits from trade by exploiting the larger foreign market (market size) as well 
as consuming cheaper imports [from Japan].”205 
(2) FKI and KITA Lack of Support for Trilateral FTA 
Despite KEIP support for a China-Japan-South Korea FTA that could address 
South Korea’s structural problems, FKI and KITA have not enthusiastically supported the 
trilateral FTA. Unlike their Keidanren peers in Japan, FKI and KITA have not been vocal 
about supporting a trilateral FTA. Outside of trilateral and bilateral meetings with the 
Keidanren listed in Chapter III, FKI and KITA have not vocally advocated for the China-
Japan-South Korea FTA on their own in South Korean media. Rather, FKI and KITA 
have been focused on the newly signed China-South Korea FTA.206 The silence on the 
issues of the trilateral FTA by FKI and KITA is deafening when compared to their 
Japanese counterparts.  
The silence concerning the trilateral FTA reflects FKI’s and KITA’s own 
understanding of which FTAs South Korean businesses prioritize. In a 2012 survey of 
FKI member firms’ positions on which FTA South Korea should prioritize, only 3.9% 
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chose the trilateral FTA.207 In a March 2015 survey, KITA found that its members were 
acutely concerned that given the progress of TPP negotiations and the probability of the 
U.S. Congress granting President Barack Obama Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), that 
TPP should be South Korea’s main concern.208 Such a concern is based from KITA’s 
own statistics that TPP would integrate countries that account for 69% of South Korea’s 
export market and 44.4% of its outward FDI.209 Following the U.S. Congress granting 
President Obama TPA in June 2015, KITA published a survey that found 62.2% of South 
Korean businesses supported joining the TPP.210 One of the main concerns that these 
businesses held if they did join TPP was “that the opening of local markets to Japan could 
hurt businesses overall.”211 Indeed, South Korean businesses are registering increasing 
Japanese competiveness in countries such as the U.S. and China despite Japan not having 
FTAs with these countries.212 
Beyond the lack of public statements by FKI and KITA, their own internal think-
tanks indicate a lack of support for the trilateral FTA despite being supportive of the 
South Korean government’s FTA-creation policy. In a 2014 policy review by a KITA 
think-tank of the government’s new 2013 Trade Roadmap, KITA agreed with the 
government’s belief that South Korea needed “to play a pivotal role in the economic 
integration of East Asia with its FTAs with both the United States and China” by 
ensuring that South Korea becomes the link between RCEP and TPP.213 The policy 
review, however, does not explain how the trilateral FTA would complement the South 
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Korean government’s approach of making South Korea into a strategic hub between the 
U.S. and China. Rather, the KITA review takes an adversarial tone with Japan in that 
“Japan has set out to beat Korea in this game” of being the lynchpin of Asia-Pacific 
FTAs.214 
b. Evidence: MoTIE and MoFA Stance toward China-Japan-ROK FTA 
(1) Focus on RCEP and TPP Instead of Trilateral FTA 
In regard to the official South Korean view of the China-Japan-South Korea FTA, 
MoTIE and MoFA have prioritized RCEP and TPP participation over the trilateral FTA 
as part of its overall FTA strategy to become a regional hub for the new mega-FTAs 
forming in the Asia-Pacific. A 2013 MoTIE White Paper explained South Korea’s new 
approach to FTAs in which the importance of mega-regional trade deals, TPP and RCEP, 
were emphasized.215 MoTIE envisioned that South Korea would not only serve as a hub 
for FTAs but also as a bridge between the American-led TPP, and what the South 
Korean’s view as the Chinese dominated RCEP. The China-Japan-South Korea FTA 
would serve as an “institutional foundation for an East Asian Community.”216 Yet, the 
trilateral FTA is framed as falling underneath the architecture of RCEP in the 2013 
MoTIE White Paper.217 Additionally, a December 2014 MoTIE sponsored conference on 
South Korean trade policy made little mention of the trilateral FTA.218 The China-Japan-
South Korea FTA was grouped together as one of many approaches to achieving mega-
FTAs in the Asia-Pacific and, the conference papers focused on the prospective economic 
gains from TPP, RCEP, and the China-South Korea FTA—not the trilateral FTA.219 
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c. Summary of Evidence and Analysis 
Overall, FKI, KITA, MoTIE, and MoFA do not view the trilateral FTA as an 
economic priority for South Korea when compared to the other mega-FTAs. These views 
make the potential explanation of economic priority a strong reason for a lack of progress 
toward a trilateral FTA. Despite the economic gains and structural reform that could be 
gained from a China-Japan-South Korea FTA, FKI and KITA have avoided making firm 
commitments to a trilateral FTA and are more interested in TPP. Yet, FKI and KITA are 
not interested in the trilateral FTA not because of a lack of economic benefits, but rather, 
they seem not interested despite the economic benefits. This is all the more puzzling 
considering that these business groups’ own think-tanks support South Korea’s robust 
FTA program of making South Korea a hub for East Asian FTAs.  
As for MoTIE and MoFA, the trilateral FTA has been subordinated by a desire to 
be a lynchpin for the newly forming TPP and RCEP mega-FTAs. Their interest in these 
other mega-FTAs reduces the priority of the trilateral FTA.  
2. Explanation 2: South Korean Agricultural Interest 
The second potential explanation to be tested is if South Korean agricultural 
interests do not view the trilateral FTA in their best economic interest, then the China-
Japan-South Korea FTA is less likely. This explanation will assess that the largest and 
most politically influential agricultural NGO, the Korean Peasant’s League (KPL), has 
never had the ability to successfully block the progress of the South Korean 
government’s aggressive FTA creation policy launched in 2001 despite vocally, and often 
violently, opposing FTAs. Past ratification of FTAs since 2001 has shown that the South 
Korean government has sufficient capacity to mollify a majority of Korean agricultural 
interest groups, including the KPL, through subsidies and NTBs in order to ensure FTAs 
are ratified through the South Korean legislature. Thus, KPL’s view that the China-Japan-
South Korea FTA is not in South Korea’s best economic interest is not a causally strong 
explanation for the trilateral FTA to be less likely. For evidence, the section will establish 
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how the South Korean government successfully appeases agricultural interest groups that 
are vehemently opposed to free trade.  
a. Evidence: South Korean Government’s Ability to Placate Agricultural 
Interests 
According to the South Korean government, the China-South Korea FTA, once 
ratified, is expected to hit the South Korean agricultural sector hard. According to 
government statistics reported by South Korean media, the bilateral FTA with China is 
expected cause South Korean agricultural output to be “cut by an annual average of 
7.7 billion won (U.S. $9.64 million) and 10.4 billion won ($9.37 million) over the next 
20 years.”220 These losses will occur despite the fact that staple crops such as rice and 
soybeans are excluded from tariff elimination in the FTA.221 The absence of these 
agricultural goods in the bilateral FTA exemplify the overall low quality of the China-
South Korea FTA. In response, the South Korean government has promised farming 
interests groups further state support in the form of subsidies to the tune of nearly a 
billion U.S. dollars over the next 20 years.222 These subsidies are an addition to the 
numerous NTBs created by the South Korean government to insulate its agricultural 
sector.223  
The ability to financially placate groups such as the KPL has reduced opponents 
to free trade, which has in turn allowed for the success of the South Korean government 
to sign and ratify FTAs with larger agricultural countries such as the E.U. and United 
States. In addition, the ability to sign such agreements in rapid succession starting in 2001  
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shows how the South Korean government has more capacity than the Japanese 
government to overcome agricultural interests. This capacity is best exemplified by the 
government’s willingness to placate the KPL during the ratification process of the Chile-
South Korea FTA in 2004. Similar to the currently proposed measures to offset 
agricultural loses expected by the China-South Korea FTA, the then government of Roh 
Moo-hyun compromised with the KPL’s political allies in the South Korean legislature 
and created countervailing subsidies to offset the effects of the Chile-South Korea 
FTA.224 As noted by Milner and Mansfield, the South Korean government has become 
adept at mollifying groups such as KPL in order to ratify FTAs.225 
b. Summary of Evidence and Analysis 
Overall, agricultural interests such as the KPL do not possess the same veto power 
to FTAs as does JA-Zenchu in Japan. The South Korean government has become adept at 
meeting the demands of Korean farmers in a quid-pro-quo relationship of subsidies in 
exchange for compliance. The current subsidies proposed by the South Korean 
government as well as the built-in protections for certain agricultural sectors in the 
China-South Korea FTA indicate that, once again, Korean agricultural interests are being 
placated. Yet, these interests are being placated at the expense of the South Korean 
budget as well as at the expense of the quality of the China-South Korea FTA. Thus, so 
long as the South Korean government continues to have the ability financially buy-off 
agricultural interests and maintain WTO-lite provision for agricultural goods, then there 
should be little resistance by agricultural opponents of free trade to the China-Japan-
South Korea FTA. 
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3. Explanation 3: South Korean Concerns of Relative Gains in the 
Chinese Market 
The third potential explanation to be tested is that if South Korea is concerned by 
competition over China’s domestic market with Japanese TNCs, then the China-Japan-
South Korea FTA is less likely. This explanation will show that FKI and KITA are 
concerned that South Korean TNCs face stiff competition from Japanese firms but that 
MoTIE and MoFA only somewhat share the same concerns, thus making the explanation 
a weak causal argument for a lack of progress. Specifically, FKI and KITA have 
registered concerns about Japanese competiveness and adaptability in both the home and 
Chinese market. Evidence for MoTIE and MoFA not quite sharing the same concerns 
will be taken from other South Korean FTAs including the recently negotiated China-
South Korea FTA. 
a. Evidence: FKI and KITA fears of Japanese Competiveness 
(1) FKI Competition Concerns during Japan-South Korea FTA 
During the negotiations for the previously stalled Japan-South Korea FTA, FKI 
complained that many South Korean sectors—other than agriculture—would suffer from 
direct Japanese competition. According to the FKI in 2004, “such a deal could damage 
Korea’s electronic, automobile, machinery and petrochemical industries,” which is a 
view in direct opposition to the one held by KIEP in Explanation 1.226 Essentially, the 
Japanese could out-compete their South Korean counterparts in both the Japanese and 
South Korean markets if tariffs were eliminated for those sectors.  
(2)  FKI and KITA Concerns over Trade Balance 
The perception of Japanese firms out-competing South Korean firms is reinforced 
by the trade balance between the two countries over the last decade. South Korea has 
continued to run a negative balance of payments in traded goods with Japan despite 
                                                 




running an overall positive balance of payments in traded goods with other countries 
(Figure 6).  
Figure 6.  South Korea Balance of Payments in Traded Goods 
 
South Korea’s balance of payments in traded goods from World Bank–WITS. No data for 
2014 China-South Korea trade balance derived from World Bank, “Korea, Rep. Trade 
Summary 2013,” World Integrated Trade Solution, accessed October 29, 2014, 
http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/Country/KOR/Year/2013/Summary. 
The South Korea-Japan trade balance also reflects qualitative differences between 
Japanese and Korean TNCs that feed FKI and KITA perceptions of being out-competed 
by their Japanese peers. As of 2010, South Korea only counted on two TNCs among the 
world’s top 100 non-financial corporations, the most competitive being Samsung in terms 
of foreign sales.227 Japan has eight TNCs competing against Korean firms in similar 
industries as well as five of the top 50 financial TNCs that have a 2010 U.S. dollar 
valuation of $5.8 trillion.228 Japanese TNCs are also seen by their South Korean 
counterparts as being able to out-invest Korean firms in China. 229 This allows Japanese 
firms to establish production as well as sales bases in these growing economies and 
receive greater market share. These qualitative difference feed into a Korean perception 
that Japan is their greatest trade competitor, not China. As one Korean economic 
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commentator in 2014 remarked, “the dominant view is that Korea could suffer big time if 
a free trade pact is signed with Japan.”230 
(3) FKI and KITA Concerns for Competition in Chinese Market 
In regard to operations in China, FKI and KITA have registered challenges for 
Korean firms as well as the slowness of Korean firms’ response to these challenges when 
compared to their Japanese counterparts. Many of these challenges include rising local 
Chinese competition and higher labor costs.231 There is also the fear that Japanese TNCs 
has diversified their presence in the Chinese market whereas South Korean TNCs have 
focused a majority of its exports on a few products. 232 FKI and KITA are wary of an 
upsurge in Japanese product competiveness. According to the LG Economic Research 
Institute, this upsurge can be attributed to Japanese PM Shinzo Abe’s Three Arrow 
reform program that has reduced the “role of direct industry promotion policy in favor of 
improvements to the business environment.”233 These Japanese structural changes are 
causing Hyundai, LG, Samsung, and POSCO to view that they are losing global market 
share to resurgent Japanese firms, which could be compounded by a FTA with Japan.234 
Furthermore, there is a perception advocated by KITA that South Korean TNCs 
are behind the curve in reacting to changes in the Chinese domestic market in that South 
Korean companies still use China for third-party production instead of selling directly to 
the domestic market. According to KITA, Korean value-added trade to China meant for 
final third-party export accounted for 47.7% of all South Korean exports to China—
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higher than Taiwan.235 Only 31.7% of Japanese exports to China were part of the value-
added trade and exports have continued to decline as Japanese TNCs are reshoring to 
Japan.236 The focus on value-added, rather than final product trade, makes South Korean 
exports more sensitive to the economic restructuring occurring in China as China shifts 
focus away from an export-driven economy. 
(4) Summary of FKI and KITA Concerns 
Overall, there is a view among FKI and KITA that Japanese TNCs are more 
competitive than South Korean TNCs in the Chinese markets and potentially in the 
Korean home market. As established in Explanation 1, FKI and KITA do not agree with 
the KEIP view that free trade with Japan can boost South Korean TNC competitiveness. 
Thus, KITA and FKI do not want an open and balanced playing field in the Chinese or 
South Korean market with their Japanese peers. 
b. Evidence: MoTIE and MoFA Views of Korean Competiveness 
(1)  Mixed Concern for South Korean TNCs 
While KITA and FKI are sensitive to competing with Japanese TNCs in the 
Chinese market, the South Korean government through MoTIE and MoFA have 
somewhat registered the same sensitivities. The conclusion of KORUS and the EU-South 
Korea FTAs indicate that the South Korean government is more than willing to open its 
home industries up to direct competition in WTO-plus FTAs with Western firms. 
However, the same cannot be said for the recently signed China-South Korea FTA. The 
protected sectors in the China-South Korea FTA match those sectors threatened, 
according to FKI, by a potential Japan-South Korea FTA.237 
If one were to assume that the South Korean government was concerned about the 
competiveness of its TNCs operating in the Chinese market, then one should expect the 
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China-South Korea to have had eliminated tariffs for industrial sectors that would have 
been threatened by a Japan-South Korea FTA in order to receive preferential access not 
yet conferred to the Japanese. Yet, The China- Korea FTA has a 91% tariff elimination 
rate and includes large sector carve-outs and prolonged tariff elimination schedules on 
both sides for automobiles, agriculture, intermediate consumer goods, light industrial 
products, and refined petroleum products—many of the same sectors that were at issue 
for FKI during the Japan-South Korea FTA negotiations. These carve-outs overlap with 
many of the South Korea’s main export products as well as politically sensitive 
industries. In regard to automobiles, the China-South Korea FTA avoided tariff 
liberalization “as both countries say the FTA may do more harm than good for their 
respective carmakers.”238 For the Korean auto sector, the aversion to tariff liberalization 
may be driven by a fear of the Korean market being flooded by Chinese manufactured 
Japanese cars. Thus, the desire for protectionism at home from intrusion of Japanese 
products produced in China seems to have more of a pull than increasing a South Korean 
competitive edge through preferential tariff elimination. Although, it is also entirely 
possible that the tariff barriers still in place in the China-South Korea FTA reflect 
Chinese sensitivities over their own industries being subject to direct competition with 
South Korean firms. Overall, it is difficult to determine to what degree the South Korean 
government is concerned by direct Japanese competition in the Chinese market. 
c. Summary of Evidence and Analysis 
KITA and FKI perceive Japanese TNCs as being able to out-compete their South 
Korean peers in the Chinese market as well as the Korean home market. While signing 
WTO-plus FTAs with the U.S. and E.U., MoTIE and MoFA have somewhat balanced 
business groups’ protectionist desires with the need to gain more market access. Yet, the 
China-South Korea FTA indicates that such a balance only goes so far and that possible 
intrusion of Japanese TNCs from Chinese subsidiaries maybe a bridge too far. Overall, 
given the mixed nature of the government’s approach to South Korean FTAs, concern 
                                                 




over Japanese competition in the Chinese market is a weak explanation for the lack of 
progress toward a China-Japan-South Korea FTA. 
4. Explanation 4: South Korean Concern for Political-Historical 
Animosities 
The fourth potential explanation to be tested is that if historical and political 
grievances negatively affect the economic relationship between China and Japan, then a 
trilateral FTA is less likely. This section will show that political and historical animosities 
have affected Japanese-Korean economic relationship and continues to act as a drag force 
on the trilateral FTA, and thus, has the strongest causal strength in inhibiting progress. 
Evidence for this position is taken from instances of high Japanese-South Korean tension 
from 2005 to the present. Two relationships will be examined, the state-to-state 
relationship of track-one level cooperation, and the business-to-business relationship of 
FKI-KITA interaction with the Keidanren. Specifically, the ability of each of these 
relationships to maintain consistent or growing patterns of interaction despite flare-ups of 
political-historical-territorial grievances will be assessed. In particular, the example of the 
Japan-South Korea bilateral FTA will be examined to see if these grievances caused that 
FTA to be ultimately scuttled or did more prosaic issues create an enduring deadlock.   
a. Evidence: Failure of the Business-to-Business Relationship 
Historical and political animosities have bled into the Japan-South Korea business 
to business relationship. As detailed in Chapter III, efforts by citizen’s groups to 
prosecute Japanese TNCs in South Korean courts for occupation reparations have 
deepened the divide. A 2013 South Korea Supreme Court ruling ordered Nippon Steel to 
pay reparations for forced work during the Japanese occupation.239 The Keidanren 
characterized the ruling as creating “obstacles” to the Japanese-South Korean economic 
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relationship.240 The ruling has been followed by another successful case in October 2014 
against a Japanese TNC.241  
These animosities caused a prolonged disjuncture in the ability of FKI and KITA 
to liaison with their Japanese counterparts, the Keidanren. Following disputes over the 
issues of comfort women, Takeshima/Dokdo, and occupation reparations, Keidanren and 
the FKI stopped holding their annual summits in 2007 after 23 years of bilateral 
cooperation.242 After a seven-year freeze, Keidanren and FKI resumed their annual 
summit in December 2014 and promised to work together toward a China-Japan-South 
Korea FTA. Following the meeting, the Keidanren met with President Park Geun-hye, a 
first under the Park administration.243 
Of particular note is the meeting between President Park Geun-hye and the 
Keidanren, the first meeting of its kind in the last 10 years by the Keidanren in South 
Korea. According to the Keidanren, the purpose of the meeting was “to set up a summit 
meeting [between Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Park].”244 This shows a proactive 
stance by the Keidanren on mending relations between South Korea and Japan. Yet, there 
has been no reciprocal visit by FKI or KITA to Japan in order to meet with Abe. 
Overall, the business-to-business relationship is a one sided affair with the 
Keidanren acting as intermediaries and FKI-KITA as passive actors. Furthermore, the 
lack of reciprocity on the part of FKI-KITA and its willingness to involve themselves in 
political-historical charged arguments indicate a lack of concern for maintain the business 
to business relationship on even keel despite flare-ups of popular and political opinion. 
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b. Evidence: Failure of the State-to-State Relationship 
In regard to the state-to-state relationship between South Korea and Japan, there 
has been a steady decrease in track-one executive and ministerial meetings since the first 
flare-up over Dokdo/Takeshima and Japanese history textbooks in 2005 (Figure 7). The 
decrease, however, has corresponded with the establishment of trilateral summits that 
have nestled Japanese and South Korean diplomatic activity under singular venues. From 
2005 to 2012, Japan and South Korean executive leaders met consecutively despite the 
slow burn of territorial and historical grievances. Yet, rhetoric from South Korean 
presidents in concern of presumed Japanese transgressions against South Korea have 
been vocal. In 2006, President Roh Moo-hyun described Japanese maritime activity in the 
vicinity of Dokdo/Takeshima as “an act that insults Korea’s sovereignty and national 
pride,” and “an act of asserting the legitimacy of Japan’s criminal history of waging wars 
of aggression.”245 Following the second Dokdo/Takeshima flare-up in 2012, the newly 
elected President Park vowed to not meet Abe until the historical and territorial 
grievances had been resolved. 246 The 2014 APEC summit that saw Abe and Xi shake 
hands could not bring Park and Abe to do the same formality for the cameras. The same 
lack of amity was seen in an early March 2014 trilateral U.S.-Japan-South Korea 
executive level meeting in which Park refused to acknowledge Abe.247  
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Figure 7.  Track-one Ministerial and Executive Level Meetings 
 
Track-one ministerial and executive level meetings. Each meeting indicates a meeting on 
the deputy-minister level and above between South Korean and Japanese officials. Data 
derived from Japanese MoFA and Center for Strategic and International Studies–
Comparative Connections. 
The frosty relationship between Abe and Park has had a corresponding effect on 
track-one ministerial meetings from 2013 onward. The trilateral executive and ministerial 
meetings stopped and so did many of the other lower-level ministerial meetings that had 
occurred from 2005 to 2012. The only meetings that have occurred from 2013 to 2015 
with any consecutiveness have been the China-Japan-South Korea FTA negotiations. 
Recently in 2015, there has been a resumption in meetings between Japan and South 
Korea on the ministerial level. In March, the trilateral China-Japan-South Korea foreign 
ministers meeting resumed.248 
c. Evidence: Animosities Bleeding into Previous FTA Negotiations 
The example of the scuttling of Japan-South Korea FTA is one of political and 
historical grievances affecting South Korea’s FTA. From December 2003 to November 
2004 there were six rounds of negotiations toward a bilateral FTA, the final round ended 
inconclusively over Japanese refusal to remove tariffs or increase quotas on South 
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Korean seaweed. While FTA negotiations stopped in 2004, other ministerial and 
executive track-one meetings occurred from 2005 to 2008 to restart these negotiations. 
Yet, in 2008, attempts at restarting the bilateral FTA were scuttled. According to a 2012 
MoFA White Paper, the prime reason for the FTA to be scuttled was Japanese 
intransigence over seaweed imports.249 Yet, the 2012 White Paper ignores the fact that 
Japan in January 2006 had come back to South Korea and expanded its quota of South 
Korean seaweed imports as demanded.250 The timing of Japan’s concessions on seaweed, 
however, occurred between the 2005 Dokdo/Takeshima flare-up and President Roo My-
hun’s inflammatory statement concerning Japanese maritime activity. Perhaps not 
coincidently, the 2012 White Paper does make an oblique reference to the shaky political 
situation between Japan and South Korea in concern of restarting a bilateral FTA when it 
stated that both countries needed to “manage their economic and trade relations in a 
stable manner.”251 
Behind government and industry positions concerning Japan, there is an 
underlying negative public opinion regarding Japan. In a 2015 public opinion poll 
conducted by Genron NPO concerning South Korean views of Japan, 72.5% of South 
Korean respondents held an unfavorable view of Japan, which was an increase from the 
previous year poll.252 The two biggest reasons for these unfavorable views in the minds 
of South Koreans were due to Japanese official positions on the status of Dokdo, Japan 
not recognizing South Korean comfort women, and “Japan’s lack of remorse for 
historical invasion of South Korea.”253 When asked if South Koreans felt greater affinity 
toward either China or Japan, 41% responded they felt greater affinity for China and 11% 
felt greater affinity for Japan.254 Despite these negative feelings, 46.6% of South Koreans 
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agree that “economic growth in Japan is both beneficial and necessary for South Korea,” 
while 37% view Japanese economic growth as a threat.255  
d. Summary of Evidence and Analysis 
Both state-to-state and business-to-business relationships failed to overcome 
political-historical-territorial grievances that have flared up from 2005 to the present, and 
that such grievances have had a tangible effect on previous attempts to reach a bilateral 
FTA. There has been recent progress in business-to-business relationships, and a 
redoubled effort by the Keidanren on patching up the political relationship between South 
Korean and Japanese leaders. Yet, FKI and KITA have not shown similar efforts on their 
part to publicly engage with South Korean and Japanese leaders to create political 
reconciliation. Overall, political-historical animosities are more of an issue on the South 
Korean side of the trilateral FTA negotiations and will continue to act as a drag force on 
future FTA cooperation. Thus, despite Japanese concessions, the South Korean side of 
the negotiating table had lost the will to resume the FTA at the same time South Korean 
domestic and political opinion had turned particularly anti-Japanese. 
C. FINAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION   
Of the four potential explanations for why there has been a lack of progress 
toward a China-Japan-South Korea FTA assessed, the fourth explanation of historical-
political animosities is the strongest. Political, historical, and territorial grievances have 
seeped into not only previous negotiations concerning a bygone bilateral FTA, these 
grievances have been strong enough to spoil Japanese and South Korean business- to-
business relationship over an extended period. In particular, these grievances seem to 
affect the South Korean business groups more than the Keidanren in that only the 
Keidanren is active in trying to repair the state to state relationship that has suffered 
progressively since 2005. 
While this chapter has identified that South Korea does not view the trilateral 
FTA as an economic priority, this explanation does not have the same force on the South 
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Korean body-politic akin to historical and political grievance. The opinion polls from 
South Korea show that anti-Japanese sentiment is strong, and in some respects, it is 
increasing over time. These views have had a stultifying effect on South Korean 
politicians and South Korean professional business groups interacting with their Japanese 
counterparts.  
As for the other two explanations of the trilateral FTA not being in the interest of 
agricultural groups and concerns of competition over the Chinese domestic market, these 
explanations provide weak causal links for explaining a lack of progress. While KPL is 
proficient at getting protestors in the streets and lobbying South Korean politicians, they 
and it are adeptly handled through key concessions by the South Korean government. As 
for KITA and FKI being concerned about competition with Japanese TNCs, MoTIE and 
MoFA have not registered the same concerns. There is a disjuncture between business 
interest groups in South Korea with their bureaucratic counterparts in the government that 
prevents this explanations for being strong enough to explain a lack of progress toward 





V. CHINA: TRILATERAL FTA NOT AN ECONOMIC  
PRIORITY FOR THE PRC 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will test four potential explanations for a lack of progress toward a 
China-Japan-South Korea FTA on the Chinese side of the negotiating table. These 
explanations focus on Chinese perceptions of economic priority, domestic interests, 
foreign business competition, and political-historical grievances. The chapter will argue 
that the strongest reason for a lack of progress by the Chinese is that the PRC does not 
view the trilateral FTA as an economic priority. After outlining the four potential 
explanations, the following sections will examine the evidence in order to test the 
strength of each explanation.   
B. EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS 
This section will present the empirical evidence for the four potential explanations 
that motivate the Chinese in regard to the trilateral FTA. Due to the opaque nature of 
PRC policy making, a majority of the evidence comes from open source media rather 
than official white papers. 
1. Explanation 1: PRC Economic Priority 
The first potential explanation to be tested is if the PRC does not view the 
trilateral FTA as an economic priority, then the China-Japan-South Korea FTA is less 
likely. For evidence, the opinion of academics from the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS) as well those opinions of the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and 
PRC leadership will be examined. This explanation will show that China’s academic 
community and MOFCOM perceptions do not view pursuing the trilateral FTA as an 
economic priority as compared to RCEP, and that this explanation is causally the 
strongest in regard to the lack of progress toward the trilateral side of the Chinese side of 
the negotiating table. 
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a. Evidence: MOFCOM and PRC Trade Policy 
As noted by a 2015 U.S. Congressional report on China’s FTA strategy, “China 
does not publish an official FTA policy.”256 The PRC does not provide white papers 
similar to that of Japan and South Korea, which provide insight into what these 
governments expect to receive from FTAs. Rather, one is left with piecing together a 
series of statements from open source publications as to what official Chinese thinking is 
in regard to PRC FTA policy. Thus, this section will draw on such statements from 
MOFCOM and CCP officials in order to show that PRC FTA policy does not prioritize 
the China-Japan-South Korea FTA similar to that of RCEP. 
(1) MOFCOM and CCP Support for Trilateral FTA 
As China-Japan-South Korea concluded their 2011 joint study for a trilateral 
FTA, MOFCOM voiced its support and optimism for a deal that would bring economic 
benefits as well as a counterweight to TPP. In an official 2012 China Daily article, the 
trilateral FTA was touted as providing China a 1.1%–2.9% boost in GDP—far above the 
expectations of the trilateral study group as detailed in Chapter II.257 In addition, a 2012 
MOFCOM press statement hailed the trilateral FTA as the counter to the TPP.258 
MOFCOM stressed the importance of a successful conclusion of the deal or otherwise 
China would “lose the advantages it gains from the economic integration of Asia.”259 
MOFCOM also touted the deal as a tool for accelerating growth in the region after the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC).260 
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(2) MOFCOM Shift Priority From Trilateral FTA to RCEP 
Yet, MOFCOM signaled a shift in thinking in 2013 toward RCEP as well as a 
rapprochement with the idea of a successful TPP. In a 2013 China Daily article, 
MOFCOM deputy trade negotiator stated that “The Trans-Pacific Partnership and the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership have common ultimate goals and will be 
the stepping stone for integrating Asia-Pacific’s FTAs.”261 In addition, the deputy 
director-general of MOFCOM’s international department stated that “China holds an 
open attitude to the TPP.”262 Nonetheless, MOFCOM would still “prioritize its trade 
talks with South Korea and Japan, while steadily advancing the RCEP.”263 Thus, 
MOFCOM put forward a parallel track to negotiating both the trilateral FTA and RCEP 
contemporaneously.  
A recent shift in priority to RCEP and away from the China-Japan-South Korea 
FTA by MOFCOM is seen in recent policy statements. In a 2014 statement concerning 
RCEP, MOFCOM made no mention of the trilateral FTA, but rather, MOFCOM posed 
RCEP and TPP together as mutually complimentary and as pillars of a future FTAAP.264 
The importance and significance of the China-Japan-South Korea FTA had been 
downgraded in comparison to RCEP and FTAAP in that the trilateral FTA is no longer 
termed as a mega-FTA, but as another regional bilateral FTA with a plus one.265 Premier 
Li Keqiang’s Government Work Report delivered to the Third Session of the Twelfth 
National People’s Congress downplayed the trilateral FTA by lumping it together in the 
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same sentence for promoting FTA talks with the Gulf Cooperation Council and Israel, 
whereas RCEP was put together with FTAAP.266 
Overall, MOFCOM and PRC officials have changed priority from the trilateral 
FTA to RCEP. This is not to say that MOFCOM and the PRC no longer view the China-
Japan-South Korea FTA as providing economic benefits, but that their focus has shifted 
to RCEP while still allowing the trilateral FTA to be pursued in tandem with other FTA 
negotiations.  
b. Evidence: Chinese Academic Policy Position 
(1) CASS and Other Scholarly Support for Trilateral FTA 
In a joint 2012 interview with both the director of the CASS Institute of World 
Economics and Politics and the Renmin University School of Economics deputy dean, 
both expressed positive views toward the trilateral FTA. 267 Song Hong, the director of 
the CASS Institute of World Economics, highlighted the much needed development of a 
formal economic institutional framework in NEA while Wang Jinbin, the Renmin 
University deputy dean, highlighted the benefits of a regional agreement that could lead 
to “healthy development” post GFC.268 Both agreed that the trilateral FTA would serve 
as a counterweight to TPP in leading toward a much wider Asia-Pacific FTA.269 
The positive opinions of the trilateral FTA were repeated in a 2013 article by Jing 
Linbo and Yuan Pinghong, researchers at the CASS Institute of Financial and Economic 
Strategic Studies, published by the Guoji Maoyi, a monthly journal sponsored by the 
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MOFCOM Research Institute of International Trade.270 Yet, the CASS article 
emphasized more than just economic concerns when pursuing FTAs. The article called 
on Chinese FTA policy to “consider changes in the global political and diplomatic setup 
and China’s strategic place in the global political structure and economic order.”271 
Specifically, CASS advocated the position that Chinese FTAs, such as the trilateral FTA, 
should be used to “to seize the initiative and gain a voice in the writing of the new rules 
of global trade.”272 
Additionally, a 2013 article in the weekly Beijing Liaowang involving CASS 
director Zhang Yunling argued that the proposed WTO-Plus FTAs, such as TPP, are 
designed to rewrite the post-war rules and marginalize China in the current economic 
order.273 Agreements such as TPP, which include provisions well beyond trade in goods 
and services, would end up “re-regulating the conduct of the economic players involved” 
in order to balance the playing field against developing and competitive countries such as 
China.274 Essentially, “the developed countries are hanging together, opening up to one 
another and jointly writing new standards, before asking other countries to fall in line.”275 
(2) CASS Change of Tone and Opinion Toward Trilateral FTA 
Yet, a pessimistic tone toward the China-Japan-South Korea FTA is taken by the 
same 2013 Liaowang article in that China does not control the pace of the negotiations of 
the trilateral FTA, and that the agreement serves Japanese purposes as a bargaining tool 
in its TPP negotiations with America rather than as a benefit for China.276 According to 
Liu Junhong of the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations, “the 
China-Japan-South Korea EPA negotiations and the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
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Partnership [RCEP] negotiations have been Japan’s main tools in its jockeying for power 
with the United States and Europe.”277 Both academics in the article agree that the set of 
FTAs being negotiated as of 2013 did not serve China’s best economic and political 
interests, to include the China-Japan-South Korea FTA.278 
As the trilateral FTA entered into its second set of negotiations, opinions from 
various CASS researchers supported shifting China’s trade priority from the China-
Japan-South Korea FTA to RCEP. According to Zhang Yunling, “All in all, the road for 
establishing the trilateral FTA will not be smooth in view of the remarkable differences in 
the economic structures,” and that “China should prioritize the establishment of the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which can compete with the United 
States-led Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement.”279 A 2014 article by Mei Xinyu, a 
researcher at the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, 
dismissed any negative implications if the deal fell through, implying that the trilateral 
FTA was not that consequential for China.280  
For those academics who supported shifting priority from the trilateral FTA to 
RCEP, they also stressed the importance and potential benefits of TPP. In a 2014 Beijing 
Jingji Cankao Bao article, Zhang Yunling softened his position that TPP could divide the 
trade order between developed and developing states.281 Rather, the rules proposed by 
TPP had long-term positive effects especially for countries such as China, and that 
developing countries could “concentrate on adjusting their economic structure and 
development policies to adapt . . .  and rebuild their comparative advantage in a bid to 
develop new competitiveness and find a new engine for economic development.”282 In 
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addition, the WTO-plus provision in TPP provide for ”the need to lower and eliminate 
the institutional and policy obstacles at home” so as to increase economic 
development.283 
c. Summary of Evidence and Analysis 
Both MOFCOM and opinions from CASS perceive that RCEP should take 
priority rather than the trilateral FTA. Greater economic priority for RCEP is seen as 
competition or hedging against TPP, not necessarily because of greater gains in economic 
welfare or efficiency. The softening of opinions toward TPP does not diminish the view 
that RCEP should be a priority for the PRC. 
2. Explanation 2: PRC SOE Interest  
The second explanation for a lack of progress toward a China-Japan-South Korea 
FTA is that China perceives domestic business interests being hurt by the trilateral FTA. 
According to the 2011 trilateral study, the Chinese machinery, automobile, and chemical 
sectors would be negatively affected by the China-Japan-South Korea FTA, which are 
dominated by influential Chinese SOEs. This section will show that China has an 
established pattern of protecting key SOE sectors in FTAs negotiated with other 
countries. The ability of the China-Japan-South Korea to negatively affect Chinese SOEs 
depends entirely on whether or not a WTO-plus agreement is being negotiated, which 
makes domestic interests a weak causal argument for a lack of progress. In order to show 
that Chinese SOEs are influential actors in the Chinese economy, this section will frame 
how the PRC views the utility of such enterprises as well as how the PRC has protected 
SOE-dominated industries in Chinese FTAs. 
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a. Evidence: PRC Market Reforms Reducing Influence of SOEs 
(1) Reducing the Presence of SOEs in the Chinese Economy 
Since 1978, the PRC has consistently pushed reform of SOEs that has caused 
these enterprises to play a reduced role in the overall Chinese economy. The PRC 
achieved the transition from a SOE dominated planned economy to a market economy by 
introducing a dual track system in the 1980s and early 1990s that allowed for the 
coexistence of both the planned and market system by setting prices that were 
preferential to SOEs and allowing private businesses to sell at market prices. This 
allowed for excess industrial inputs to be freed up and used efficiently through the market 
economy. The size of SOEs were kept constant while private and semi-private enterprises 
were allowed to expand so as to eclipse the relative contribution to GDP by SOEs. Barry 
Naughton terms this as “growing out of the plan” in which the planned economy was 
kept constant in its absolute size so that as the market economy took off, the relative size 
of the planned economy decreased.284 In the mid-1990s, the dual track system was 
replaced with a market system. 
Reforms brought on by China’s accession to the WTO and compliance with WTO 
rules has further reduced the presence of SOEs in the Chinese economy. From 2003 to 
2013, the number of SOEs in which the PRC owned majority shares was reduced from 
196 to 115.285 According official PRC statistics, the national presence of SOEs as a 
percentage of total assets, employment, gross industrial output, and enterprises operating 
in the PRC has been reduced markedly since 1998 (Figure 8). Yet, SOEs still control 
significant market share in sectors that the PRC deems as strategic and pillar industries. 
As of 2014, SOEs control nearly 40% Chinese corporate assets.286 Of those assets 
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controlled by SOEs, 82% were from the “petrochemicals, electric power and grid, 
defense, telecommunications, transport, mining, metallurgy, and machinery sectors.”287 
Figure 8.  The Share of SOEs in All Industrial Enterprises 
 
From Gang Fan and Christopher C. Hope, “The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the 
Chinese Economy,” in U.S.–China Economic Relations in the Next Ten Years: Toward 
Deeper Engagement and Mutual Benefit (Hong Kong SAR: China-United States 
Exchange Foundation, 2013), 361, http://www.chinausfocus.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/2022-Part-1_eng.pdf. 
(2) Merging of CCP and SOE Interests 
In addition to still being a significant part of the Chinese economy, SOEs have 
been subject to increasing control and protection by the CCP. In 2006, the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) put forward a proposal 
that SOEs in certain economic sectors of Chinese economy should have a majority 
market share in those sectors depending on whether or not those sectors were deemed as 
strategic or pillar industries, which include those sectors negatively affected by the 
trilateral FTA.288 Strategic industries are sectors in which the PRC “must play a leading 
role in every enterprise,” whereas pillar industries “must remain under state control” by 
SOEs.289 According to a 2014 U.S. Trade Representative Report (USTR) to Congress, 
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SASAC has tightened its grip on SOEs through the application of state security laws to 
SOEs and limiting Chinese SOEs from accepting FDI.290 Additionally, in 2010, the 
Central Committee of the CCP passed a measure that requires SOEs “to establish a 
collective decision-making system in which the Communist Party plays a significant role 
in major business decision, major personnel changes, and major project arrangements,” 
which the CCP refers to as the Three-Major One-Large  Decision Making System.291  
(3) SOE Influence in Chinese FTAs 
The PRC position that machinery, automobiles, and chemicals are pillar industries 
is reflected in how it treats those sectors in its various FTAs that have been concluded 
over the last decade. For instance, the China-Switzerland FTA has a claimed 90% and 
greater tariff exemption rate, but for products that fall under machinery and chemical 
classification, the duty exemption rate falls between 64%–78% of Swiss goods imported 
by China.292 Another instance of built-in protectionism of pillar industries is seen in the 
China–Taiwan Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Despite the 
inclusion of Taiwanese chemical products under the Early Harvest Program (EHP) of the 
China–Taiwan ECFA, the total number of chemical products included only accounted for 
10% of what the Taiwanese originally asked for in negotiations.293  
While Chinese FTAs can be credited for having greater than 90% tariff exemption 
rates, these FTA are far from being termed as WTO-plus agreements. A majority of 
Chinese FTAs share protections for strategic and pillar industries similar to that of the 
Chinese FTAs with Switzerland and Taiwan.294 The consistency by which the PRC 
protects key industries such as chemicals, automobiles, and machinery supports the 
explanation of domestic interests causing a lack of progress toward a trilateral FTA. Yet, 
the explanation assumes that China would agree to a WTO-plus version of the China-
Japan-South Korea FTA. If a trilateral FTA were brought to Chinese standards of 
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selective tariff elimination similar to previous Chinese FTAs, then SOE interests could be 
mollified.  
b. Summary of Evidence and Analysis 
Overall, Chinese SOE interests are only hurt if the China-Japan-South Korea FTA 
is a WTO-plus agreement that precludes the usual Chinese pattern of picking and 
choosing tariff eliminations for key industries. If all three countries agree in principle to 
create a WTO-plus agreement in which Chinese SOEs would be hurt, these firms and 
their allies in the CCP would push back against a trilateral FTA. If the China-Japan-South 
Korea FTA is less than a WTO-plus FTA, then the ability of the PRC to ensure protection 
for key industries increases, which decreases the likelihood of Chinese SOE 
intransigence. Thus, the explanation of domestic interests slowing the progress of the 
trilateral FTA on the Chinese side of the negotiating table is a weak causal argument.  
3. Explanation 3: PRC Concerns of Relative Gains in Domestic Market 
The third potential explanation to be tested is that if the PRC views Chinese SOEs 
as operating at a disadvantage to Japanese and South Korean competitors in the domestic 
market, then a trilateral FTA is less likely. This section will show that despite admitting 
the weakness of PRC SOEs, the recent China-South Korea FTA has shown a willingness 
on the part of the PRC to open certain SOE dominated sectors. Using the China-South 
Korea as a template for the trilateral FTA, Chinese concerns of their SOEs does not act as 
a drag force on a potential trilateral FTA. This explanation will outline current problems 
with PRC SOEs and show that despite these problems the PRC has been willing to 
compromise on tariff reduction in certain SOE sectors.  
a. Evidence: PRC SOEs and PRC Willingness for SOE Reform 
The CCP has serious concerns over the performance of its SOEs and its 
bureaucracy, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC), to enforce fiscal probity among the SOE elite. PRC President Xi Xinping has 
launched an anti-graft campaign aimed at not only CCP members, but also focused on 
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China’s SOEs.295 Of concern for the CCP is the poor performance of its SOEs as 
compared to private Chinese corporations.296 Xi Jinping, in state media, has called for 
microeconomic level reforms targeted at SOEs in order to root at graft.297  
Aside from graft, Chinese SOEs have failed to provide a return on investment 
similar to private Chinese corporations. Despite attempts at structurally reforming some 
SOEs, many Chinese SOEs have consistently underperformed their private peers, and the 
return on investment gap between the two since 2007 has continually widened.298 
Chinese business commentators have openly talked about the failure of SOEs to provide 
adequate returns on profit due to inflexible government policies and quotas.299 The 
Chinese government “continue[s] to call for maintaining absolute control of important 
sectors and strategic areas” that seems to preclude opening Chinese SOEs up to direct 
competition without state-support.300  
Yet, the recently signed China-South Korea FTA shows PRC willingness to open 
up some SOE dominated sectors to direct competition. While the Chinese automobile 
sector is protected in the China-South Korea FTA, the SOE dominated petroleum sector 
has been opened, albeit on the higher end of the elimination schedule of 15 years after 
ratification.301 This indicates that the PRC is willing to open some of its sectors up to 
direct competition. Although, the long lead time up to tariff elimination also suggests that 
the PRC does not want the change to happen immediately.   
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b. Summary of Evidence and Analysis 
Overall, CCP concerns over the effectiveness of PRC SOEs does not act as a drag 
force on the China-Japan-South Korea FTA. Despite corruption crackdowns—which 
could also be explained by political motivations and consolidation of power—and the 
inability of SOEs to provide adequate return on investment, the PRC is willing to open 
certain sectors of state control to direct competition, albeit over an extended period of 
time. The China-South Korea FTA shows that China is willing to make certain 
concessions in regard to its SOE dominated sectors such as petroleum.  
4. Explanation 4: PRC Concern for Political-Historical Animosities 
The fourth potential explanation to be tested is that if historical and political 
grievances negatively affect the economic relationship between China and Japan, then a 
trilateral FTA is less likely. This section will show that despite political and historical 
animosities, Sino-Japanese relations are able to remain at an even keel of hot 
economics—cold politics and do not act as a drag force on the trilateral FTA. Evidence 
for this position is taken from instances of high Sino-Japanese tension in 2005, 2010, and 
2012. Specifically, the ability of state-to-state relationship on the track-one level of 
economic engagements being mended due to the mediating influence of business-to-state 
relationship will be examined during these time periods.  
State-to-state ties will be assessed through official statements and papers through 
open-source media and official government media outlets. Business-to-state links will be 
assessed through incidences of the business community intervening during the three 
dispute time periods. Specifically, action by the Keidanren and other business groups 
meeting with state officials will be tracked. 
a. Evidence: Testing the Relationship in 2005 
(1) 2005 State-to-State Relationship 
Starting in early April 2005, following anti-Japanese riots due to historical 
grievances and lasting for nearly a year, China-Japan state to state relationship suffered 
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but still existed on lower levels and on different subjects than those that were driving the 
acrimony. By April 21, both foreign ministries had deescalated their tones and called for 
bilateral meetings.302 On April 22, Bo Xilai, the Chinese commerce minister, continued 
the positive signaling by stressing the importance of China-Japan economic 
interdependence and dismissed public calls for a boycott of Japanese goods as 
counterproductive.303 Asia–Africa Summit in Jakarta on April 23, President Hu Jintao 
and PM Junichiro Koizumi met, shook hands, and held a private meeting that was 
deemed a successful rapprochement by Koizumi.304  
Beyond national leader and foreign minister meetings, more prosaic state-to-state 
links continued. The second China-Japan climate change dialogue occurred the same 
month as the Hu and Koizumi meeting, and was followed three months later by an annual 
security related officials meeting.305 Even when Koizumi visited Yasukuni Shrine in 
October, China-Japan was able to hold monthly and multi-issued consultative meetings 
from September 2005 to May 2006 when ministerial talks resumed.306 Only during the 
months of May and June 2005 did China-Japan not hold any meetings or talks between 
the various parts of their governments.   
(2) 2005 Business-to-State Relationship 
During the see-sawing tensions of 2005, the Keidanren remained very active and 
served as an intermediary. On May 23, the Keidanren held a luncheon with the Chinese 
Vice Premier Wu Yi,307 and the New Japan-China Friendship Committee for the 21st 
Century met in Kunming City led by Fuji-Xerox in July.308 On separate occasions, the 
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Keidanren visited Wen Jiabao on September 26,309 and then with Hu Jintao on 
September 30 in the lead up to Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine the following 
month.310 On October 19, Keidanren officials commented that political tensions had no 
effect on China-Japan economic relations.311  
(3) 2005 Summary of Results 
Both relationships continued to perform sufficiently despite the rise in political-
historical animosities. State-to-state links took nearly a year to completely coalesce on 
the track one ministerial level, but other diplomatic dialogues were able to continue. 
Business-to-state links served in an intermediary role when ministerial track one level 
diplomacy failed and maintained dialogue with China’s top leadership.  
b. Evidence: Testing the Relationship in 2010 
(1) 2010 State-to-State Relationships 
Despite rising tensions in the East China Sea that marked the beginning of 2010, 
China and Japan was still able to conduct track-one level diplomacy. On May 5, the 
fourth trilateral foreign ministerial summit between China-Japan-South Korea was held in 
Gyeongju, South Korea as well as other separate meetings concerning trilateral free trade 
and investment agreements.312 This was followed shortly thereafter by another trilateral 
summit between leaders of China-Japan-South Korea on  May 30 in Jeju, South Korea.313 
This meeting produced another forum for trilateral cooperation, the Trilateral 
Cooperation Secretariat, and a renewed commitment to trilateral free trade and 
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investment agreements.314 The sixth annual Tokyo-Beijing Forum between various 
Chinese and Japanese ministries brought more calls for cooperation. 
By the time September 7, 2010 and the fishing boat incident occurred, China-
Japan formal bilateral relations had reached a new high-water mark. No more than two 
months would have to transpire before an informal meeting between PM Kan and 
Premier Wen occurred at the Asia-Europe Meeting with promises for more bilateral 
talks.315 In October, there were anti-Japanese protests in China, but they were not as 
intense or as violent as those in 2005. In October, Chinese and Japanese foreign ministers 
were able to meet and talk about issues other than just the East China Sea.316 The 
November APEC summit in Yokohama brought PM Kan and President Hu together.317 
The first half of 2011 saw relations return to their normal tempo of diplomacy with 
annual trilateral ministerial meetings occurring on schedule.318 
(2) 2010 Business-to-State Relationship 
During the 2010 incident, a major rift between the business-to-state linkages 
surfaced. Japan’s business community accused China of cutting rare-earth mineral 
production and shipment in September shortly after the fishing trawler incident as a form 
of punishment.319 Multiple Japanese ministries and the Keidanren attempted to convince 
the Chinese to return rare-earth trade levels to previous rates but were rebuffed by claims 
that the reduction was necessary in order to prevent such materials from being 
depleted.320 Analysis of events afterwards show that considerations of a Chinese draw-
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down in rare-earth minerals was already being considered as early as July, two months 
prior to the trawler incident.321 Furthermore, when China did reduce global exports, 
Japanese exports were not singled out.322  
Although the diplomatic dispute lasted for three months, 2010 also brought to 
light a more subtle difference in business to state linkage. 2010 marked the first time that 
the Keidanren did not meet with either the Chinese President or Premier.323 Why the 
change in treatment occurred starting in 2010 is not stated anywhere in open-source 
media. 
(3) 2010 Summary of Evidence 
Once again, both relationships performed sufficiently despite the rise in historical-
political tensions. State-to-state relationship had actually matured since 2005 so that more 
lower-level ministerial meetings were able to take place. Business-to-state relationship 
remained effective, however, the inability of Keidanren leaders to meet with the Chinese 
Premier and President is notable. 
c. Evidence: Testing the Relationship in 2012 
(1) 2012 State-to-State Relationship 
Diplomatically speaking, the beginning of 2012 proceeded productively despite 
the ongoing tensions in the East China Sea. In May, Premier Wen and PM Noda still met 
for the trilateral China-Japan-South Korea summit and agreed upon continuing a trilateral 
free trade agreement.324 Additionally, a trilateral investment agreement was signed and 
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each country agreed to work together in concern of growing North Korean tensions.325 
Yet, May 2012 would be the last time for another two years until executive and high level 
ministerial meetings would begin. 
The purchase of the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese government in September 
2012 sparked a firestorm in China that placed diplomatic relations into a two-year long 
deep freeze. The purchase was shortly followed by riots in over a hundred Chinese cities 
in which Japanese businesses were targeted on a scale much larger than 2005.326 Even 
during the annual Asia-Europe Meeting, PM Noda and Premier Wen were unable to have 
a chance meeting in the hotel that both were staying at in Laos.327 
Yet, economics still exerted a centripetal force on the bilateral relationship. 
Japanese and Chinese trade ministers were still able to go ahead with negotiations over 
the trilateral FTA with their first meeting in March 2013. In 2013, a trilateral deputy 
foreign ministers meeting was held in Seoul. Five months later, a postponed annual 
trilateral environmental ministers meeting was held in South Korea.328 
An actual breakthrough in the deadlock did not occur until a meeting in Qingdao, 
China on September 23, 2014, leading up to the APEC meeting in November.329 The 
meeting allowed Abe and Xi to meet at APEC and to be photographed shaking hands, 
and in November, China-Japan foreign ministerial meeting occurred for the first time in 
two years.330 
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(2) 2012 Business-to-State Relationship 
The 2012 breakdown in China-Japan relations witnessed Chinese and Japanese 
business groups that were much more involved in changing the tone of the political 
rhetoric than in either 2005 or 2010. Despite a slew of China-Japan business conventions 
being cancelled immediately  after the events of September 2012, the Keidanren led a 
charm offensive in early 2013 and sustained its momentum leading up to the September 
2014 Qingdao rapprochement. In February 2013, Keidanren led a business delegation to 
Beijing and met with former veteran foreign ministry officials in Beijing.331 The 
following July, Keidanren led another business delegation to China and met with 
members of the CCP Standing Committee. This meeting was followed by public remarks 
on China’s Central Television by Yu Zhengsheng, fourth ranked member in the CCP 
Standing Committee, that China-Japan relations needed to be stabilized.332  
In September 2013, a Keidanren delegation visited China and met with retired 
influential members of the CCP in Beijing.333 Also in September, there was a reciprocal 
visit by Chinese business leaders to meet with officials in Tokyo.334 By November 2013, 
Keidanren were now able to meet with high ranking CCP politicians in Beijing, namely 
Deputy Premier Wang Yang.335 Keidanren and other business groups in Japan also began 
to pressure the Japanese government in January 2014 to improve bilateral relations in a 
joint press conference.336 In April 2014, Chinese and Japanese business leaders met 
publicly in Tokyo to signal that economic cooperation between the two nations were still 
alive and well.337 
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On September 22, 2014, one day prior to the official state-state Qingdao meeting, 
a Keidanren delegation was sent to meet with either President Xi Jinping or Premier Li 
Keqiang in a similar fashion as when it had met with Premier Wen and President Hu in 
2005. Yet, the delegations was only able to meet again with Deputy Premier Yang as it 
had the previous year.338 The inability of Keidanren to meet with executive level 
decision makers in China during high tensions is a noticeable difference.  
(3) 2012 Summary of Evidence 
Despite the long lead time up to the Xi-Abe handshake, both relationships 
performed effectively. As compared to the other years, state to state links took more time 
to coalesce on the track one executive level. Yet, lower level ministerial and trilateral 
diplomacy with South Korea continued from 2012 to 2014 on issues concerning 
investment and trade. Business to state relationship operated more intensely and 
repetitively during this time as opposed to 2005. Keidanren executives, however, were 
still unable to meet with either the Chinese President or Premier.  
d. Summary of 2005, 2010, and 2012 Evidence and Analysis 
Overall, Sino-Japanese relations are able to remain stable despite historical-
political flare-ups and do not act as a drag force on the trilateral FTA. Yet, the influence 
of the Keidanren on Chinese decision making has changed over the years. While still 
being able to meet with the Chinese Deputy Premier, the Keidanren have lost direct 
access to the Chinese President and Premier. The inability of the Keidanren to have such 
access might be why the business group so publicly lobbied on behalf of a Sino-Japanese 
cooperative relationship in the last political upheaval as opposed to its low key approach 
in 2005. 
C. FINAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION   
The change in opinion by the PRC that the China-Japan-South Korea FTA is not 
an economic priority is the strongest explanation for a lack of progress toward the 
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trilateral FTA. Essentially, neither CASS nor MOFCOM see the trilateral FTA as being 
any more significant in terms of being a priority as any other Chinese bilateral FTA. 
Given that Chinese FTA policy seeks to create both economically and politically 
competitive mega-FTAs vis-à-vis recent American efforts in regard to TPP, RCEP—and 
the recently announced proposals for FTAAP—provides for such needs, while the 
trilateral FTA has lost such economic utility in the eyes of CASS and MOFCOM.  
Of the other three potential explanations, the second explanation of SOE interests 
slowing the progress of the trilateral FTA does not have adequate evidence. SOE interest 
and influence seems to have been effectively controlled by the PRC in that the CCP 
decides which SOE sector gets protection rather than the other way around. Additionally, 
SOE interests slowing the FTA is contingent on the final configuration of the China-
Japan-South Korea FTA–WTO-plus or not WTO plus agreement. 
As far as the PRC being concerned about domestic competition by Japanese and 
South Korea TNCs, the evidence suggests that the PRC has an open mind. The China-
South Korea FTA has shown that China is willing to open certain state-dominated sectors 
to foreign competition. This willingness may have even wider implications concerning 
Chinese plans to move the economy away from export-oriented growth toward 
endogenous domestic-demand growth by facilitating the creation of efficient, 
competitive, and profitable industrial sectors. 
The most surprising lack of evidence is the fourth explanation, that historical-
political animosities cause a lack of progress toward a trilateral FTA. Although, taken in 
context with observations from Japanese TNCs operating in China that do not see such 
animosities as affecting their bottom line in Chapter III, the ability of Japanese business 
groups to liaison with CCP officials and the willingness of such CCP officials to meet 
with those groups to help reduce tensions make sense. Neither side wishes to disrupt the 
goose that has laid the East Asian golden egg of trade in value added goods as detailed in 
Chapter II. Despite historical divisions, Sino-Japanese relations will continue with 
zhengleng jingre. 
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Overall, the shifting Chinese perceptions of the benefits of the China-Japan-South 
Korea FTA have affected the lack of progress on the Chinese side of the negotiating 
table. As detailed above, the Chinese are willing to open certain sectors otherwise off-
limits and are not pre-occupied by economic-nationalist sentiments when it comes to the 










This chapter provides a summary of the main explanations for the China-Japan-
South Korea FTA’s lack of progress and illustrates the regional security implications of 
the trilateral FTA. Overall, Japan is the least willing participant to push for progress 
toward a trilateral FTA. Japan as well as China perceive the trilateral FTA as not an 
economic priority. The explanation that bests accounts for a lack of progress on the South 
Korean side of the negotiating table is that South Korea currently views historical and 
political animosities as a roadblock for further economic relations with Japan. The 
security implications of a lack of progress toward the China-Japan-South Korea should 
not be misconstrued as a breakdown in NEA relations—specifically between China and 
Japan—that could slide into conflict. Instead, the lack of progress is indicative of the 
hemming and hawing of these regional actors coming to grips with who leads economic 
integration and how one defines a high quality FTA in the Asia-Pacific. In addition, 
greater NEA regionalism that could be created by the trilateral FTA will not necessarily 
diminish the role and influence of the U.S. in the region. 
B. MAIN EXPLANATIONS 
The research question this study addressed is: what explains the limited progress 
toward a China-Japan-South Korea FTA? In doing so, various factors that influence the 
trilateral relationship between China, Japan, and South Korea were considered. These 
factors included international, regional, state, and domestic levels of analysis. Everything 
from global trade liberalization through the WTO, regional economic and political venues 
for cooperation, the presence of other regional FTAs, transnational business operations, 
regional competition, domestic politics, and national animosities  have had a hand in 
influencing the trajectory of the China-Japan-South Korea FTA.  
In order to address the research question and consider all of these factor 
influences, this study created four potential explanations for a lack of progress toward a 
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China-Japan-South Korea FTA. The first potential explanation assessed whether or not 
each country perceived a trilateral FTA as an economic priority. The second potential 
explanation assessed whether or not influential domestic business interests were hurt by a 
China-Japan-South Korea FTA. The third potential explanation explored if China, Japan, 
and South Korea were motivated by relative gains. Finally, the fourth potential 
explanation assessed the influence of China-Japan-South Korea antagonisms in politics, 
history, and security on the prospects of the trilateral FTA. The strength of evidence for 
each of these explanations for each of the countries is summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Strength of Evidence for Explanation  
 
 
The two main explanations that this study assesses as primarily contributing to a 
lack of progress in reaching a trilateral FTA are of these countries not perceiving the 
trilateral FTA as an economic priority, and that regional antagonism prevent further 
trilateral economic cooperation. Specifically, Japan and China do not perceive the 
trilateral FTA as an economic priority when compared to the other mega-FTAs of TPP 
and RCEP. For Japan, TPP takes priority for Japanese economic interest due to TPP’s 
promised WTO-plus standards that assist Abe’s goal of achieving the third arrow of 
structural reform. For China, RCEP takes priority as balance to TPP. For South Korea, 
political and historical antagonisms permeate the bilateral relationship with Japan. Anti-
Japanese South Korean public opinion is mirrored in positions taken by South Korean 
businesses and the South Korean government.  
Of the three countries negotiating the trilateral FTA, Japan seems to be the 
primary actor for slowing progress. As discussed in Chapter II, Japan gains the least in 
terms of absolute welfare gains and efficiency gains relative to China and South Korea. 
The scope and quality of the FTA affects Japan more than China and South Korea. A 
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trilateral FTA that is not a WTO-plus agreement perpetuates Japan’s negative trade 
balance with China. Additionally, when comparing the economic gains of a trilateral FTA 
that does not reduce NTBs as compared to the TPP that has a stated aim of reducing 
NTBs, Japan stands to gain the most with a high quality TPP vice a trilateral FTA that 
currently does not guarantee complete tariff elimination. 
C. REGIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA, JAPAN, AND 
SOUTH KOREA 
The progress of the China-Japan-South Korea FTA is significant in terms of 
regional security implications because the trilateral FTA serves as a barometer for 
regional cooperation. The ability of China, Japan, and South Korea to come to 
agreements—both political and economic—add to the stability of the not just Northeast 
Asia but also all of the Asia-Pacific. When a political-economic arrangement such as the 
trilateral FTA seems to stall after a period of rapid progress, one should step back and 
assess the underlying reasons. These underlying reasons could indicate that previously 
assumed patterns of economic interdependence in Northeast Asia have plateaued or are 
beginning to breakdown. Due to the hub-and-spoke alliance system between the U.S., 
Japan, and South Korea that provides stability, the focus should be placed on the China-
Japan bilateral relationship. Of concern is that the lack of progress toward the trilateral 
FTA indicates the end of warm economics in the warm economic-cold politics 
relationship between China and Japan.  
Interdependence theorists predict that the economic interdependence of China and 
Japan will be followed by more politically peaceful cooperation. According to John 
Oneal and Bruce Russett, “Countries that are interdependent bilaterally or economically 
open to the global economy, whether democratic or not, have an important basis for 
pacific relations and conflict resolution.”339 In other words, sunk costs in one another’s 
economies will make such countries averse to conflict. Continuing interdependence can 
lead to complex interdependence that consists of multiple channels and an absence of a 
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hierarchy of issues. 340 These two factors combined create conditions that reduce the 
probability of the use of force to solve conflicts.341 Multiple channels implies that the 
state is not the only actor, but rather sub-state entities such as bureaucracies, individual 
government officials, NGOs, and TNCs can create dense networks.342 Multiple hierarchy 
of issues ensures that no one issue can paralyze the flows of interdependence between 
states.343 Complex interdependence leads states to become enmeshed in a series of 
sensitivity and vulnerability interdependencies that constrain aggressive behavior.344  
Recently, concerns have been raised questioning the current state of economic 
interdependence between China and Japan.345 Primarily looking at trends in Japanese 
FDI to China as a leading indicator, there has been a falloff in investment between the 
two countries.346 Similarly, the value of total Chinese exports to Japan has flat-lined as 
well as the value of total Japanese exports to China has markedly dropped since 2011.347 
The fear is that the cold relations between China and Japan since 2012 have had a 
negative effect on bilateral trade and investment, a proposition working in the opposite 
direction of that hypothesized by complex interdependence. Quoting Samuel Huntington, 
Forbes columnist Gordon Chang warns that the weakening of Sino-Japanese economic 
interdependence is akin to the political-economic situation of the 1930s, and such a 
situation “can be ‘war-inducing’ instead of ‘peace-inducing’ if ‘states do not expect high 
levels of interdependence to continue.’”348 
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The reply to these concerns over weakening Sino-Japanese economic 
interdependence as being similar to the situation of the 1930 is like comparing apples to 
oranges. The world economy before both World Wars was not fundamentally the same 
liberal trade regime that exists today.349 This speaks to a normative glue between China 
and Japan that is instilled by a liberal institutional underpinning.350 Specifically, the 
WTO architecture provides China and Japan with self-satisfying interdependencies based 
on the current liberal trade system that incentives participation in factor-driven 
production links to feed a globalized economy. Rather than promote protectionism and 
retrenchment, certain economic sectors in China and Japan should be incentivized to 
lobby for greater trade and investment so as to increase efficiency and profit.351 This has 
allowed certain actors, such as the Keidanren in Japan, to have disproportionate influence 
on decision makers and policy.352 
The slowdown in China-Japan-South Korea FTA negotiations has more to do 
with each of these countries’ views on how the WTO architecture—specifically that of 
the Doha Round—should be applied to Northeast Asia. For the Japanese, large regional 
FTA’s in the Asia-Pacific should be WTO-plus agreements, whereas the Chinese and 
South Koreans take a pick-and-choose approach to WTO-plus provisions. As noted in 
Chapter V, the PRC has shifted its opinion from being overtly negative to cautiously 
accepting of TPP as some Chinese scholars perceive economic utility in TPP’s WTO-plus 
provisions. The lack of progress toward a China-Japan-South Korea FTA is more 
indicative of a division of opinion, then it is of a fundamental breakdown in the economic 
relationships of Northeast Asia. 
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D. REGIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
The question for the United States’ role and interest in Northeast Asia is whether 
or not the trilateral FTA diminishes American influence in Northeast and East Asia over 
the long run. This section will briefly review how the U.S. has played an ambiguous role 
in regard to creating greater NEA regionalism by China, Japan, and South Korea as well 
as the potential impact to the U.S. role in the region of a successful or failed China-Japan-
South Korea FTA. 
The U.S. has had an ambiguous role in regard to NEA regionalism. While not 
publically speaking against NEA regionalism, the U.S. has blocked some regional 
specific institutions that were developed by Japan and China. In 1997, Japan announced 
its intention to create an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) in response to the Asian Financial 
Crisis (AFC). Along with China, the U.S. undermined Japanese attempts to create the 
AMF and successfully ensured the institution was scuttled.353 Recently, the U.S. and 
Japan opposed joining the Chinese Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank (AIIB).354 
While the AMF and AIIB are monetary and investment institutions, they are examples of 
NEA efforts toward creating greater regionalism due to inadequacies in the current global 
liberal trade order of the U.S.-led Bretton Woods system. Similarly, the impetus of the 
China-Japan-South Korea FTA was a reaction to the failure of the WTO, an intrinsic part 
of the global liberal trade order. In regard to American interests in the region, institutions 
such as the AMF and AIIB are perceived as diminishing the influence of the American-
led Bretton-Woods system in East Asia.  
In regard to the China-Japan-South Korea FTA, a successful trilateral FTA could 
not necessarily be in the U.S. best interest in Northeast Asia. Such an exclusive 
agreement among these NEA actors could possibly diminish the role and influence of 
American power in the region, especially in regard to growing Chinese influence in the 
region. As Cheng-Chwee Kuik—a researcher at National University of Malaysia 
Strategic Studies program—observes that due to the “importance of China to virtually all 
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U.S. allies and partners, it is not unthinkable that an increasingly closer intra-Asian 
collaboration might over time erode the very foundations of U.S.‐Asia ties.”355  For 
Japan and South Korea, enhanced cooperation and stability could reduce the utility of the 
U.S. hub-and-spoke alliance system in East Asia. A successful trilateral FTA could 
provide Japan and South Korea with a sense of assurance regarding Chinese foreign 
policy, which is often seen as aggressive. Essentially, a trilateral FTA could change the 
regional environment so as to allow China, Japan, and South Korea to reassess their 
interests vis-à-vis the role of the U.S. in East Asia. The cold politics in the region in 
which the U.S. has played a mediating role could change into a more benign environment 
that could lead China, Japan, and South Korea to identify their self-interests as not 
requiring the current level of American involvement in the region. 
Not concluding a trilateral FTA can potentially serve U.S. interests by 
maintaining American influence and power in the region. A stalemate in NEA regional 
economic cooperation maintains the status-quo in East Asia in which the U.S. plays a 
pivotal role as both an economic and security provider. This status-quo is a form of 
hedging and balancing by Japan and South Korea in regard to Chinese military power and 
foreign policy due to a perception of mistrust.356 For the Japanese, China is to be 
balanced against by a policy combination of “dynamic defense” and “dynamic 
deterrence.”357 For the South Koreans, the influence and power of China is hedged by 
“Seoul’s calculated strategic ambiguity.”358 These policies are backstopped by the hub-
and-spoke alliance system that binds Japan and South Korea to America. The status-quo 
also compels China to accept American involvement in the region as a mediating force 
between itself and its NEA neighbors. While the Chinese may decry American influence 
                                                 
355 Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “An Emerging 3rd Pillar in Asian Architecture? AIIB and Other China-Led 
Initiatives,” East-West Center Asia Pacific Bulletin 305 (March 26, 2015): 2. 
356 Chung, “East Asia Responds to the Rise of China.” 
357 Jimbo, “The Rise of China and Japan’s Foreign Policy Reorientation,” 259. 
358 Chung, “Korean Views of Korea-China Relations,” 221. 
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in the region as a holdover from the Cold War, they do not deny that the American 
presence has utility in ensuring a peaceful environment for China.359 
Overall, it is more likely that the status-quo will remain regardless of the success 
or failure of the China-Japan-South Korea FTA. Regional competition between China 
and Japan will continue as well as regional insecurity created by the opaque nature of 
China’s foreign policy and Chinese military modernization in its near-abroad. While not 
seeking to exacerbate regional tensions, the U.S. policy of ambiguity toward NEA 
regionalism will continue to serve as a moderating influence in the region. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The China-Japan-South Korea FTA will continue to be slow rolled by its 
participants until all sides can come to a fundamental agreement as to whether or not 
WTO-plus FTAs are the norm or the exception in the Asia-Pacific. While negative public 
opinion and rhetoric concerning historical and political grievances can seem to suck the 
oxygen out of the region, the ability of such grievances to affect the economic relations of 
Northeast Asia are temporally ephemeral. In addition, one should be cautious in 
misdiagnosing the lack of progress toward a trilateral FTA as indicating a breakdown in 
the bottom-up and ad-hoc trade relations that have stitched Northeast Asia together. In 
regard to American interests, the success or failure of the China-Japan-South Korea FTA 
will have little influence on the regional forces that create a perception of mistrust, which 
in turn maintain the utility of the American role in the region.   
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Asia.” 
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